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Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the
Metamorphoses of the Legal
Distinction
Pierre Schlag*
At the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools
in 1927, the President, Herman Oliphant, sounded the alarm:
Our part in shaping the future of legal scholarship ... makes this an
appropriate time and gathering to consider what seems to be a most
profound change which has been slowly and imperceptibly creeping
into our treatment of problems in Anglo-American law, a fundamental
its
change which merits careful study in order that we may recognize
1
presence, measure its extent, and judge its consequences.
Oliphant's words were hardly minced. His tone was sinister: There

was something big, probably reptilian in origin, slowly but surely creeping into the body of Anglo-American law. Oliphant was kind enough to
forewarn his audience of the nature of this dread development. Said
Oliphant: "Let me anticipate my conclusions by asserting that we are
well on our way toward a shift from following decisions to following so' '2
called principles, from stare decisis to what I shall call stare dictis.

Today, Oliphant's words seem... well, they seem quaint. In part,

that is because he was right: The august and disciplined practice of
stare decisis is now quite dead.3 What has replaced this great engine of
Anglo-American law is by no means settled. A cursory examination of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A., Yale University, 1975;
J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1978.
For their help with this article, I wish to thank Eric Chiapenelli, Connie Dillon, Deborah
Maranville, Bob Menanteaux, John Mitchell, Michael Newcity, Chris Rideout, John Schlegel,
David Skover, and Jeff West.
1. Oliphant, Presidential Address, Association of American Law Schools (Dec. 1927),
reprinted in 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 71-72 (1928).
2. Id. at 72.
3. In fact, stare decisis (in the sense that only the decision on itsfacts is binding) is so dead
that it is hard to conceive that it could once have been the subject of raging controversy
among elite legal scholars. But it was--early in this century. Indeed, numerous articles debated with great passion the meaning, significance, and virtues and vices of the rule of precedent and stare decisis.
For a sampling of this controversy, see Goodhart, Case Law in England and America, 15
CORNELL L.Q. 173 (1930), Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 LAw Q. REv. 180 (1934), Kocourek &
Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 ILL. L. REV. 971 (1935), Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE LJ. 1243 (1938), Pound, What of Stare
Decsis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941), Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning
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the authoritative sources on the received, immanent vision of law suggests, however, that the most successful candidates for "engine of the
law" status are doctrine, policy, and principle. 4 But quite obviously,
there are any number of other contenders, such as microeconomics,
class struggle, grand theory, and so on. 5 Disputes about which of these
is truly the moving force in law are typically characterized as "substantive." In this article, I want to discuss an aspect of this "substantive"
dispute that is typically called "form."
Accompanying the ascendance of the rule of doctrine, policy, and
principle (as well as the other contenders), there has been a rise in the
status of the legal distinction. Once a rather homely accessory for the
interpretation of case law, the legal distinction has now come into its
own. In fact, it's on the rise. Contemporary legal consciousness has
transformed (and is still transforming) the legal distinction into something more imposing, more unsettling-something that might be called
'6
"the splits."

This article traces the conceptual metamorphoses of the legal distinction, its evolution into the splits. I begin fairly late in the conceptual genealogy of the legal distinction, in part because I want to get7
fairly quickly to a description of our own situation and our own future.
The reason for this urgency will soon be apparent. In the later stages
of the splits, reason furnishes a series of cannibal moves-moves which
seem to consume our visions of law, of reason, and perhaps of the splits
themselves.
Prdjudizienrechtin Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1933), and The Status of the Rule ofJudicial
Precedent, 14 U. CIN. L. REV. 203 (1940).
I don't mean to overstate the case; precedent and stare decisis remain important in our
legal culture. See, e.g., Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). But even a cursory
review of the literature above will show how much the contemporary practice of adjudication
and modem theories of adjudication depart from a system "truly" based upon stare decisis
and the rule of precedent.
4. These authorities on the received, immanent vision of law, of course, are Barron's,
Emmanuel's, and Gilbert's outlines.
5. See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
6. I use this seemingly vacuous term, "contemporary legal consciousness," precisely because I do not want to locate the subject of these developments in the author or in the reader.
By the end of this essay, the reasons for this choice will be apparent.
7. Besides, this approach leaves room for a different (more historical and less conceptual) inquiry into the genealogy of the legal distinction. For instance, it is no small wonder
how legal scholarship could move from a sustained preoccupation with precedent and stare
decisis in the '30s and '40s to wrestling with paradigms, models, antinomies, dualities, and
contradictions in the '70s and '80s. Compare note 3 supra and accompanying text (1930s and
1940s) with notes 11-17 infra and accompanying text (1970s and 1980s).
A true genealogy of the rise of the legal distinction would have to begin much earlier. I
start from the premise that legal distinctions are currently seen as an important aspect of law
and legal discourse. Distinctions such as invitee and trespasser, and conditions precedent and
conditions subsequent, are seen as essential aspects not only of our statutory and constitutional law but of our common law as well. It is not clear, however, that the legal distinction
always played such a crucial role. Throughout the '30s and '40s, for instance, legal commentary eclipsed the legal distinction in favor of a closely related subject, namely, the meaning
and uses of precedent and stare decisis. See note 3 supra.

April 1988]

CANNIBAL MOVES

The legal distinction. Perhaps the surest sign that the legal distinction
has assumed an important role in legal discourse is the increasingly
stylized character of the attacks that legal distinctions invite. In this first
stage, the techniques for attacking legal distinctions assume an almost
routine, stereotyped quality. First, a legal distinction can be attacked
because its categories are fuzzy at the border (imprecision). Second,
one can attack a legal distinction because some of the stuff in one category also belongs in the other-and vice versa (overlapping opposition). A third way of impeaching a legal distinction is to argue that
some stuff does not belong in either category (false dichotomy).
Fourth, one can argue that the two categories are not categories at all
but rather an inept attempt to divide a spectrum (discontinuity). Fifth,
one can show that the legal distinction is mapped on the wrong axes,
that the dichotomy does not capture the true gist of the opposition (idiosyncratic definition). Sixth, it even seems possible with certain legal
distinctions to argue that each category is totally the other
(incoherence).8
As the formal means of attacking legal distinctions become routine,
a sense arises that all legal distinctions are vulnerable to such attacks.
8. For a summary of these moves, see generally P. SCHLAG & D. SKOVER, TACTICS OF
(1986). For an earlier discussion of the vulnerability of legal categories, see
J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 169-91 (1950). For a depiction of stages in the
decline of a legal distinction, see Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistincLEGAL REASONING

tion, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
For a satirical look at Duncan Kennedy's piece, see Shapiro, The Death of the Up-Down
Distinction, 36 STAN. L. REv. 465 (1984). Shapiro very amusingly uses the up/down distinction
(and its permutations) to highlight the absurdity of Kennedy's work. In this way Shapiro attempts to show how silly it is to think that legal discourse could be subordinate to deep splits
such as the up/down distinction. Indeed, it's quite clear that law is a far loftier enterprise
exempt from such lowly metaphors as the up/down distinction and that Kennedy's work can
only be considered subversive.
Okay, I'll stop with the puns. Anyone who still thinks that legal discourse is not shaped
by the rhetorical force of the up/down distinction should reconsider Marbury v. Madison and
the role that the up/down distinction served in establishing this basic icon ofjudicial review:
[W]hether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a
question deeply interesting to the United States .... That the people have an original
right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion,
shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American
fabric has been erected.... The principles, therefore, so established,are deemedfundamental: and as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act,
they are designed to be permanent.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) (emphasis added). Next, ChiefJustice
Marshall questioned whether the Constitution controls legislative acts repugnant to it or
whether the legislature may alter the Constitution by ordinary act:
Between these alternatives, there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a
superiorparamountlaw, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary

legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to
alter it.

...

Certainly, all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as
forming the fundamental and paramountlaw of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to
the constitution, is void ....

If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it,
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With this recognition, legal distinctions are no longer merely the careful technical demarcations of differences within the case law. Rather,
they become weak points, vulnerabilities in the corpus of the law-the
points where rules, doctrine, policy, and theory can be unhinged
should the need or the interest arise. Of course, this does not establish
that distinctions lack coherence or value. 9 Granted that things may not
look too clean at the edges, but then again, law was never meant to be
the realm of perfection. Pragmatism, good judgment, and a serious
commitment to craft are sufficient to plug the gaps and keep the enterprise secure.10
Splits. The second stage in the evolution of the legal distinction entails a sudden and sweeping reversal. The unflattering picture of legal
distinctions as signs of weakness in the corpus of the law dissipates.
Instead, the legal distinction emerges as an organizing principle. Retrieved from the exile of embarrassing border phenomena, the legal
distinction now occupies a central position-it is treated as a crucial
determinant or decision point in the production of law and legal discourse. No longer a mere distinction, the dominance of the new creature is confirmed with power names such as "contradictions" and
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect?...
This would be to overthrow, in fact, what was established in theory ....
... This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.
Id. at 176 (emphasis added). I do not mean to suggest that the up/down distinction was the
only or even the dominant metaphor in Chief Justice Marshall's arguments. After all, the
opinion does rely quite a bit on visual metaphors and on the inside/outside distinction in
arguments about the judicial role in constitutional interpretation:
If, then the courts are to regard the constitution ....
Those, then, who controvert the principle, that the constitution is to be considered ... are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on
the constitution, and see only the law ....
Gould it be the intention of those who gave
this power, to say, that in using it, the constitution should not be looked into? ...
In
some cases, then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can
open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or to obey?
... Why does ajudge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution
of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is
closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?
Id. at 178-80 (emphasis added).
9. For example, at this stage, one can still claim that, even if legal distinctions are fuzzy
at the periphery, they are nonetheless clear and determinate at their core. See H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 119-37 (1961) (arguing against the indeterminacy of legal directives on
the basis of a core/periphery distinction). But see Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv.
379 (1985) (suggesting that the determinacy and certainty of legal directives depends upon
the context and arguing that the context is itself dependent upon a prior formalization or
interpretation).
10. As one commentator puts it:
[A] workable method of legal interpretation can be conceived in recognition of the
fact of widespread agreement among members of the legal community on what law
permits or requires in a wide range of cases. Uncertainty persists, and legal reasoning proceeds in relation to the conventions of an interpretive community.
S. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 98 (1985); see also id. at 199-215.
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"schisms,"'" or "alternative models" and "competing paradigms." 1 2
At this point, the legal distinction is generally infused with some arguably sur-legal content: the stuff of ethics, epistemology, and social theory. This is the golden stage of the legal distinction. Its sweep is
broad, its power virtually limitless, its significance relatively uncontested, and everybody who's anybody is doing the splits.13 It is no
11. Now, it is important to choose the right sort of distinction. One cannot expect to
explain much about legal discourse if one chooses the invitee/licensee distinction as the or-

ganizing principle. Better to pick something a bit more sweeping, say, the reason/desire dichotomy, or the self/other schism, or the public/private distinction.
The prominence of these particular dichotomies in the legal literature is associated with
the work of critical legal studies (CLS) scholars. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrics
(1975) (reason/desire); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV.
209, 211-12 (1979) (self/other); Symposium on the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv.

1289 (1982) (public/private). And indeed it is tempting to think that the contemporary use of
the dichotomy as an organizing principle is largely limited to and a product of critical legal
studies. It is tempting, but it is surely wrong. See notes 12-13 infra.
12. Before CLS emerged on the scene and popularized words like "dualism," "contradiction," and "schism," there were a host of more centrist legal scholars who were (and continue to be) fond of "competing models," "alternative paradigms," and so on. See, e.g., B.
ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCrING AMERICAN LAw 72-104 (1984) (describing and advocating a shift
from the traditional common law paradigm that focuses on individual cases to the more
sweeping social engineering paradigm of economics); P.S. ATIYAN, THE RiSE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CoNTRACr 189-209 (1979) (arguing that there has been a shift in contract law
from the paradigm of individual autonomy to a paradigm based on collective moral ideas,
customary practice, and redistributive ideologies); Damaika, Structures ofAuthority and Comparative CriminalProcedure, 84 YALE LJ. 480 (1975) (comparing a "Hierarchical Model" of criminal
procedure, which places a premium on certainty of decisionmaking and uniformity across
cases, with the "Coordinate Model," which aims at reaching the decision most appropriate in
the circumstances); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972)

(counterpoising a neo-Kantian "paradigm of reciprocity" against an instrumentalist "paradigm of reasonableness"); Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1

(1964) (describing the "Crime Control Model," which claims that repression of crime is the
most important function of the criminal law system, and the "Due Process Model," which
asserts the primacy of the individual and seeks to implement anti-authoritarian values);
Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 544-50

(1986) (counterpoising a "modem paradigm" of atomism, autonomy, and separation with a
"classical paradigm" that recognizes connection and an inter-subjective vision of the self).
This fondness of centrist scholars for dichotomous visions was manifested not only in
fancy theoretical work but in doctrinal work as well. For instance, in the '60s there was a
raging controversy over the meaning and content of state and private action in constitutional
law. See Black, Foreword: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California'sProposition14, 81 HARV.

L. REv. 69, 70 (1967) (asserting that state action "is the most important problem in American
law"); Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 503, 503 (1985) (suggesting that
in the '50s and '60s, "probably no topic attracted more attention in law reviews than 'state
action' ").

The one major school of thought that still resists dualism is the law and economics
school, which revels in the monism of the dollar. But it too has a few contradictions to deal
with. See Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase'sThe Problem of Social Cost- A View from the
Left, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 919.

13. Both CLS scholars and more centrist scholars attempted to make these splits tractable-though to quite different ends and in quite different ways. The very fact that centrist
legal scholars could conceive the legal distinction as an organizing principle suggests that this
dualism does not necessarily threaten law or legal discourse. And in some senses, it doesn't.
Even as the center embraced dualism under the rubrics of "competing models" or "alternative paradigms," it offered the possibility of resolving this dualism in a satisfactory manner. I
cannot possibly document here all of the strategies used, but I can suggest a few of the main
ones. For instance, a description of two competing paradigms would often be accompanied
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longer two-bit distinctions that occupy attention, but major splits, such
as:
14

ethics,
deontological versus consequentialist
5
democracy,'
versus
review
judicial
private versus public, 16 or
17
self versus other.
The split has got the law by the tail.
More Splits. What comes next is therefore something of a rude
shock. The splits multiply and displace each other. Ruling paradigms

remain split, but they are no longer so ruling and no longer so paradigmatic. Fundamental contradictions remain split, but they are no longer

so fundamental. To be sure, some splits, such as subject/object, fact/
value, and private/public, remain more important than others, but
nonetheless their dominance becomes relative and contingent. Gone is
the belief in some "top split" that dutifully serves to organize the
others into a tractable order. What remains is a view of law and legal
discourse as the relatively fluid interaction of sundry splits. And if one

assembles enough splits, it may even be possible to come up with a
fairly cogent account of law and legal discourse. 18 Since splits can be
by the normative suggestion that one was right and the other wrong. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra
note 12, at 564, 569-73. In other cases, the thrust of the argument seemed to be that we were
in the process of moving from one paradigm to the other, thus explaining the present (but
soon to be overcome) mess: This is Kuhn's (by now) ubiquitous Kuhnian "paradigm shift."
See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENrIFIC REVOLUTIONs 66, 150 (2d ed. 1970); see also
Packer, supra note 12 (the trend is from the "Crime Control Model" to the "Due Process
Model"). Another common strategy (particularly among courts) was to suggest that one could
harmonize opposed interests or values through "sensitive adjustment of the competing considerations in light of all the surrounding circumstances." In a word: balancing. For criticism
of this approach, see Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943
(1987).
All this suggests that the use of the distinction as an organizing principle does not necessarily threaten law or legal discourse. But while some centrist scholars did their best to defuse
dualism of its potential for disruption (with the kinds of strategies described above), some
CLS scholars did the opposite. The latter presented dualisms as challenges to the coherence
of law and the integrity of legal discourse and sought to trace the manifestations of the dualisms in concrete doctrine. See, e.g., Feinman, Promissory Estoppel andJudicialMethod, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 678 (1984).
14. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 12.
15. Scholarly debates seeking to reconcile judicial review with democracy have occupied
many constitutional law scholars in the late seventies and early eighties. Rather than cite ad
nauseam the works that constitute this debate, I will simply cite one work which seeks to
achieve closure on this issue. See Chemerinsky, The Price ofAsking the Wrong Question:An Essay
on ConstitutionalScholarship andJudicialReview, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207 (1984) (questioning the
validity, fairness, and usefulness of the terms upon which the debate has been based).
16. The public/private distinction has been a powerful, long playing split in the work of
some CLS scholars. For what may be its culminating glory, see Symposium on the Public/Private
Distinction, supra note 11. In a prior life, during the '60s, the public/private distinction featured mightily (albeit less visibly) in more centrist debates about the state action doctrine. See
Chemerinsky, supra note 12.
17. For a statement of this "fundamental contradiction," see Kennedy, supra note 11, at
211-13.
18. This assumes that one can come up with 90 or so seemingly distinct splits-a task
which hardly taxes the imagination. See generally Appendix 1 infra.
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readily combined with each other (through merger or by succession),
the binary quality of the splits does not require an overly reductionist
account of law and legal discourse. 19
At this point, I think the splits become threatening to a variety of
"substantive" intellectual and legal projects. Now that the idea of the
split is taken seriously, a hierarchy or ordering of splits no longer seems
credible. The implications for "substantive" projects in law or legal
discourse are significant. Scholarly talk of models or paradigms or fundamental contradictions becomes vulnerable. The foundationalist
pretensions of these formal concepts are now evident, and therefore no
longer credible. And the possibility of isolating any particular split for
discussion begins to seem naive. 20 It no longer seems possible to trace
the ostensible incoherence of legal liberalism to a fundamental contradiction such as self/other or public/private. 2 1 Similarly, what first
seemed to be manageable (albeit ambitious) inquiries about how to reconcile judicial review with democracy now seem wholly unmanageable,
22
posing endless confrontations with a barrage of other splits.
On a more practical level, the rule of law seems threatened. If the
splits can arrange and rearrange themselves without reason and in no
apparent order, regulative ideals such as neutrality, consistency, or fairness become weak, if not suspect. 23 It becomes exceedingly difficult to
give a rational account of the legal enterprise. And it becomes very
difficult to give an account of the legal enterprise in which reason plays
a leading role.
Now, it is important not to overstate the implications of these challenges. Even if reason cannot rule, this hardly means that the law will
be bereft of order or regularity. Nor does it establish that the legal
enterprise is therefore necessarily illegitimate. What the emergence of
the splits does indicate, however, is that the regularity and the legitimacy of the legal system will depend upon something less like reason
.. . and more like interpretive communities, 2 4 the values of the cul19. On the contrary, a modest number of distinctions of form (and substance) can yield
a great deal of fragmentation.
20. See Schlag, The Brilliant, the Curious, and the Wrong, 39 STAN. L. REV'. 917, 918, 926-27
(1987) (describing the problems attending formal delimitation of subject matter in legal
scholarship).
21. See Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1984) (suggesting that the fundamental contradiction-self/other--is too easily reified and thus must be
displaced); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1152, 1274-90 (1985)
(arguing that law and legal discourse consist of a multiplicity of reified, but otherwise socially
contingent, metaphors).
22. See text accompanying notes 53-58 infra;see also Appendices 1 & 4 infra.
23.

For the classic accounts of the rule-of-law virtues, see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF

Lxw 33-94 (1964), and F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). For a more recent articulation (and revision), see Moore, A Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277,
313-20 (1985).
24. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TE~xT IN THIS CLAss? (1980); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L.
REv. 1325 (1984). Fish's concept of "interpretive communities" is deliberately elusive-allowing readers of varied degrees of sophistication (and from many different disciplines) to
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ture, 25 the good sense of the legal community, 26 class relations, 27 the

invisible hand of the market, 28 and so on.
Each of these contenders has some intellectual appeal; each offers
the possibility of situating law in some greater and grander context that
will then lend the legal enterprise some stability, or at the very least,
some regularity. And this will be true so long as the greater and
grander contexts (the interpretive communities, the cultural values,
etc.) are not themselves subject to the splits. Currently, there is no reason requiring us to view interpretive communities or cultural values as
ruled by splits. By the same token, however, there is no reason to suppose that interpretive communities or cultural practices are any more
immune to the splits than is the legal enterprise itself. So the question
remains (or rather resurfaces): Is there any way to stabilize or contain
the splits?
Law and legal discourse are ongoing enterprises, so it is not easy to
tell. But currently, legal consciousness is entranced by a series of cannibal moves that seem to frustrate even the most sophisticated attempts
to contain the splits. In what follows I describe four of these moves
which contemporary legal consciousness cannot seem to shake. I have
called them infinite regress, split proliferation, catch-22, and overkill. These
moves are related, and my presentation shows each of the moves as
collapsing into the next.
Some preliminary observations on the status of my own discourse
are warranted. First, these moves are already part of our legal consciousness-part of the third stage in the rise of the legal distinction
described above. 29 Second, these moves have not yet been explicitly recognized as formal aspects of legal reasoning. While the moves are used
project their own meaning into the concept. With that caution, one can nonetheless read Fish as
arguing that judges, literary critics, and other professionals perform their interpretive work
from within sets of professional strategies, techniques, and purposes. These (inarticulable)
bundles of strategies, techniques, and purposes constitute what Fish calls "interpretive communities." And it is these interpretive communities (not the text, not the author's intent, not
the individual reader) which enable and legitimate certain interpretations (legal or otherwise)
while preventing and disabling other interpretations.
This is one reading of Fish-probably the most common to his legal audience. But as the
words of caution above indicate, there are obviously other readings of Fish's work. For elaboration, see Schlag, Fish v. ZappiThe Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEo. LJ. 1 (1987)
(forthcoming). See also note 40 infra.
25. See J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POLITICS OF LAW
(1985);J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984). White champions the critical
reading of classic texts-philosophical, literary, and political-as sources for the transformation of our culture, our law, and ourselves. White attempts to demonstrate how the values
drawn from these classic texts can inform legal choices such as appropriate rationales for
criminal punishment.
26. See S. BURTON, supra note 10, at 199-215. Burton argues that adjudication is legitimate if the legal community provides a legal and political system that merits and enjoys the
allegiance of the people.
27. See M. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
28. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986).
29. Moreover, each move has been used frequently in the legal literature. See notes 45,
47 & 64 infra; see also Appendices 2 & 3 infra.
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frequently in the legal literature to attack or establish this or that position, there has not yet been any general, formal discussion of the moves
or any formal recognition that these moves are always available across a
wide variety of legal contexts.3 0 Third, while these moves are produced
by reason, they bite the hand that feeds them. They repeatedly consume the contributions of reason to the organization of law and legal
discourse. In short, they are cannibal moves.3 1 Now, given these observations, it is a cinch that I will have some difficulty finding an appropriate language in which to talk about these moves. 3 2 This difficulty
explains why my argument sometimes employs seemingly fuzzy terms,
like "legal discourse," and why my arguments seem to turn on themselves. By33 the end of this essay, the reason for this approach will be
apparent.
Infinite regress. This move is associated with turtles which are usually
found in footnotes to law review articles.3 4 Recently, however, the turtles have climbed out of the footnotes and into the text.3 5 One version
of the turtle story goes like this:
A prominent scientist had just given a brilliant lecture on the foundations of the universe. During the question period an elderly woman
suggested that there was a problem with the professor's analysis.
"What is that?" asked the professor cautiously. "It's all wrong," the
woman replied, "because the universe actually rests on the back of a
giant turtle." The professor, taken aback, forced a smile and then
countered: "If that's the case there is still the question, what is that
turtle standing on?" The audience tittered, but the woman, undaunted, replied: "Another, much larger turtle." "But.... ." objected
36
the professor. "I'm sorry, Professor, it's turtles all the way down."
30. See notes 45, 47 & 64 infra; see also Appendices 2 & 3 infra.
31. They are also instrumental in the evolution and change of law and legal discourse.
See notes 109-11 infra and accompanying text.
32. 1 cannot use the language of the second stage, because the discourse generated by
that stage would provide a false picture of the third stage. On the other hand, I can't exactly
pretend that the implications of these moves for legal discourse are already well known
(otherwise I would have nothing further to say).
33. One last note: These moves are generally more explicit in legal scholarship than in
the positive law (i.e., judicial opinions). In part, this reflects the different rhetorical situation
of judges (who are deeply implicated in the legal enterprise) and legal scholars (who can
afford to take a less partisan perspective). These moves are sufficiently challenging to the legal
enterprise that one would not expect judges to make frequent explicit use of these moves in
their opinions. (These are, after all, cannibal moves.) None of this, however, is intended to
suggest that these moves are limited to legal scholarship. On the contrary, I think that the
moves form and inform the development of the positive law.
34. See, e.g., Michelman, Foreword- Traces of Sef-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 65 n.352
(1986); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,
96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 792 n.32 (1983).
35. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. LJ. 1, 1-2 (1986); Singer, Radical
Moderation, 1985 At. B. FOUND. RES.J. 329, 329-30. For other instances of turtles in the text,
see the articles cited in note 45 infra.
36. Cramton, supra note 35, at 1-2. For an early version of the story, albeit one
grounded in rocks, not turtles, see W. JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE AND OTHER ESSAYS IN
POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 104 (1897).
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No doubt there are many interpretations of the turtle story. 3 7 One interpretation suggests that the turtle story is the legal scholar's
equivalent of the three-year-old's persistent and annoying inquiry,
"Why?" The three-year-old never stops asking why, no matter what the
answer is. If only she could read Wittgenstein, she would realize that
the point of the turtle story is that the giving of reasons must come to
an end because all thought is ultimately situated in a form of life.38 She
would understand that the point of the turtle story is that certain questions only make sense within certain language games, and that apart
from those language games some questions simply do not make sense.
They only yield turtles.3 9 But, if the three-year-old were a truly committed, paradigmatic three-year-old, she would not be satisfied with this
response. And if we turned the tables on her and asked her, "Why
not?," she would undoubtedly reply that all Wittgenstein has done is
simply to produce a bigger and better turtle-one that doesn't look like
a turtle at all but does precisely what one wants a turtle to do, namely,
ground the universe.
In contemporary legal discourse, Stanley Fish plays (or at least
seemed to play) the part of Wittgenstein. 40 Fish argues quite cogently
that the turtle problem is not really a problem at all because we are
"always already" sitting on a turtle and things could not be any other
37. As one interpretation of the story indicates, it is not (and could not) ever be clear
what a turtle really is. Disregarding this cautionary note, a hopelessly inadequate definition
might go like this: A turtle is an explicit or implicit attempt to ground intellectual, professional, or cultural discourses in a stable foundation.
38. "'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?'It is what humans say that is true or false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not
agreement in opinions but in form of life." L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
241, at 88e (G. Anscombe trans. 2d ed. 1958) (emphasis in original).
39. See id. T 50, at 25e (inquiring into whether the platinum meter bar in the Paris Museum is really one meter).
40. Fish systematically deconstructs foundationalist, formalist, and essentialist accounts
of legal practice. See Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 645, 655-61 (1986); Fish,
supra note 24; Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 Te. L.

REV. 551 (1982). On the connection between Fish's enterprise and Wittgenstein's work, see
Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (1986). Cornell argues that, in Anti-

Professionalism, Fish departs from Wittgenstein's insight in two ways. First, Fish inappropriately argues that professional contexts place determinate constraints on the critique of those
contexts. Second, Fish claims (again inappropriately) that critiques of professional contexts
rest on an essentialist view of meaning or a transcendental subject.
But it's not really clear that Fish ever meant to play the part of Wittgenstein. Indeed, at
times, his arguments seem steeped in Kant-as when Fish argues (against Mark Kelman) that
we can never be self-conscious of our interpretive constructs because those interpretive constructs are themselves a condition of consciousness. Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory,
96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987) [hereinafter Dennis Martinez].
There is also the view that Fish is not engaged in a philosophical enterprise at all, but a
rhetorical one. According to this view, Fish simply borrows the philosophical style for persuasive clout. See Rosmarin, On the Theory of "Against Theory, "in AGAINST THEORY 80, 86 (W.J.T.
Mitchell ed. 1985).
There is much to be said for this view. After all, it is probably philosophers who are most
likely to see Fish as engaging in a philosophical enterprise. Literary critics, by contrast, are
more likely to see Fish as revising and perfecting "reader response theory." Legal
pragmatists, anti-theorists, and anti-intellectuals are likely to see Fish and his interpretive
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way.4 ' Fish's solution is immensely appealing because it plays upon
our intuitive sense that we will never be able to get around the turtle
problem. So we might as well make peace with our turtle and give it a
comfortable name such as, say, oh I don't know ....

Satan? No,....

4 2 Yeah, that's the ticket. 4 3
How about.. . "interpretive communities"?
At some point, however, our three-year-old is going to get fed up, perhaps even angry-in which case she might turn to Nietzsche, who gives
voice to the suspicion that the history of Western philosophy has just
44
been one fat turtle after another.
community thesis as a sustained vindication of their dearest insights. As for postmodernists,
they are likely to see Fish as a (lapsed) deconstructionist.
The very possibility of projecting into Fish's text so many obviously professional readings, in
one sense, serves to buttress Fish's own interpretive community thesis: that one is always
interpreting and operating Within an interpretive community. For an elaboration of these
points and a critical appraisal of Fish's rhetoric, see Schlag, supra note 24.
41. Fish, supra note 24, at 1345. As Fish puts it:
To put the matter baldly, already-in-place interpretive constructs are a condition
of consciousness. It may be... that the thinking that goes on within them is biased
(which means no more than that it has direction) but Without them (a pun seriously
intended) there would be no thinking at all. It follows then that the one thing you
can't do in relation to interpretive constructs is choose them, and it follows too that
you can't be faulted either for not having chosen them or for having chosen the
wrong ones; moreover, it follows that it makes no sense to condemn as "non-rational" the reasoning that proceeds within interpretive constructs because that's the
only kind of rationality there is. Finally, by the same reasoning, if you can't choose
your interpretive constructs, then neither can you know them (in the sense of holding them in your hand for inspection), and if you can't know them, you can hardly be
expected to take them into account when you come to explain the process by which
you reached your conclusions.
Dennu Martinez, supra note 40, 1795-96 (footnote omitted). For Fish, the problem is that theory has imperialist ambitions and is constantly trying to govern, control, or explain practice by
coming up with better and more powerful turtles. But theory is always already sitting on a
turtle of its own, and therefore, the ambitions of theory will never be realized. See Fish, Consequences, in AGAINSr THEORY, supra note 40, at 106.
42. S. FisH, supra note 24. I cannot give a full account here of my reasons for thinking
that Fish has not surmounted the turtle problem. For a brief discussion of the rhetorical
appeal of Fish's account of interpretation, see Schlag, supra note 24.
43. Other comforting options include the positivist contribution of the rule of recognition (H.L.A. Hart) and the "grundnorm" (Hans Kelsen), both of which underlie the entire
legal system even though presently we do not know much about what they look like. See
H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 92-93, 97-103, 112-14, 141-42 (discussing the ultimate rule of
recognition); H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-214 (1967) (discussing the nature and
role of the grundnorm, or the basic norm, in relation to the legal order). For a provocative
and critical attempt to discern the rule of recognition of the United States, see Greenwalt, The
Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MicH. L. REv. 621 (1987).
Another option is the natural law suggestion that reason is the key. This view offers the
promise that when all the turtles are heard from, we will be able to tell which one is really on
the bottom because it will be the "best" one. See Moore, supra note 23, at 325-26 (arguing
that judges should evaluate competing theories of death to determine which one most closely
approximates its "true nature"). Or the advocate of natural law can simply bite the bullet and
declare that it is quite "self-evident" which turtle is on the bottom. See J. FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs 64-70 (1980). Then, too, there is Dworkin's suggestion that there
are, not just one, but three turtles underneath it all: moral philosophy, positive law, and
aesthetics. R. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE (1986). According to this view, the task of thejudge is
to try to establish the best conversation possible among the three turtles.
44. Consider Nietzsche's summation of Kant's work:
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Many of us in the legal community do not take Nietzsche or
Wittgenstein seriously, but we do deal quite a bit in turtles. 4 5 And this
is something of an embarrassment, if only because our concern with
turtles greatly resembles the plight of the three-year-old, who always
wonders, "Why?" Indeed, that is why it was so tempting to talk of turtles in the context of three-year-olds: The obvious strategy is to degrade the problem by likening it to infantile consciousness. But that
move is obviously just another turtle, and besides, who would dare suggest that eminent scholars like Fish, Fiss, and Dworkin are producing
turtles?
And yet, turtles are nothing to sneer at. We could do far worse,
after all, than situate law and legal discourse on the back of a turtle.
Many of us will be quite content to do so as long as it works: Pragmatism has no axe to grind with turtles. And since it is law and legal discourse we are after, not perfection, why begrudge the enterprise a
turtle or two here and there, as the need arises? So turtles are okay, at
least for some purposes.
The relevant question, however, is whether they will help with the
splits. Is there a way to stabilize these things? After all, it will simply
But let us reflect; it is high time to do so. "How are synthetic judgments a priori
possible?" Kant asked himself-and what really is his answer? "By virtue of afaculty"but unfortunately not in five words, but so circumstantially, venerably, and with such
a display of German profundity and curlicues that people simply failed to note the
comical niaiserie allemande involved in such an answer. People were actually beside
themselves with delight over this new faculty, and the jubilation reached its climax
when Kant further discovered a moral faculty in man-for at that time the Germans
were still moral and not yet addicted to Realpolitik.
...A time came when people scratched their heads, and they still scratch them
today. One had been dreaming, and first and foremost--old Kant. "By virtue of a
faculty"-he had said, or at least meant. But is that-an answer? An explanation?
Or is it not rather merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce
sleep? "By virtue of a faculty," namely the virts dormitiva, replies the doctor in Mo-

lire ....
F. NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EvIt 18-19 (1966) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in
original).
45. For discussions of the infinite regress in various legal contexts, see, e.g., S. BURTON,
supra note 10, at 182-83 (deploying the infinite regress against legal formalism by demonstrating that it is incapable of sustaining a legitimating foundation), Boyle, Thomas Hobbes and the
Invented Tradition of Positivism: Reflections on Language,Power and Essentialism, 135 U. PA. L. REV.

383, 421, 425 (1987) (deploying the infinite regress against essentialist, conventionalist, and
purposive accounts of law), Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas": Logical PositivistAnalyses of Equal-

ity and Rules, 91 YALE LJ. 1136, 1139-47 (1982) (using the infinite regress against the logical
positivist analysis of the legal concepts of equality and rules), Moore, MoralReality, 1982 Wis.
L. REV. 1061, 1075-76 (using the infinite regress to attack subjectivist accounts of moral statements), Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of Voidable Prefer-

ences, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 44, 51, 90 (1986) (noting the infinite regress associated with the
attempt to tailor the preference law of bankruptcy to the moral or economic "fact" of bankruptcy), Peller, Book Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 863, 876 (1985) (arguing that cost-benefit
analysis invites an infinite regress because what counts as a cost or a benefit will be determined in part by the cost-benefit calculus), and Wilcox, Book Review, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
408, 411-12 (1983) (suggesting that coherence theories ofjustification may be a more attractive response to the infinite regress problem than skepticism or the assertion of self-evident
principles).
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not do to send people to jail or foreclose mortgages merely because
some splits have been left free to roam through law's empire without
reason. Now, as I mentioned before, there is no reason to conclude
that these splits are running amok. Still, one would like to know that
46
they're not.
This desire to know has yielded the very popular epistemological
infinite regress. Very simply, it goes like this: 47 When we say, for instance, that some standard in tort law is objective, do we know this in
an objective way? The answer is yes, we do, because we have objective
norms to govern legal interpretation. The question then is, how do we
know that we have objective norms of interpretation? The predictable
answer is that these objective norms are supported by objective institutional practices. The question then becomes ...and the answer is that
those institutional practices are objective because... (and here we get
various answers):
because we are always already within these interpretive
practices and
48
could not be without them (pun seriously intended).
because there is a grundnorm or master rule of recognition (which,
admittedly, we know little about but are quite certain exists). 4 0
because there are
disciplining rules which serve to monitor the institu50
tional practices.
because there
are formal and normative constraints on the institutional
51
practices.
This list by no means exhausts the answers, but it is unseemly to add
more: As the number of divergent answers to the question increases so
does the embarrassment to the legal enterprise. The whole point of the
46. And one might like to know for all sorts of reasons. Preserving the rule of law is one
reason. See note 23 supra. A slightly more modest reason might be a desire to maintain the
distinction between law and violence. And even if that distinction breaks down, it remains
important to know that the splits are under control-if only to assure that the violence of law
remains effective and does not lapse into the random. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
LJ. 1601, 1628-29 (1986). Obviously, the listing of reasons could go on and on.
47. Or like this, for instance: Consider the claim that constitutional interpretation requires recourse to the original understanding. Starting from that claim, one might ask how
one discovers the original understanding-what procedures should be followed, what evidentiary rules should be used? See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REV. 204, 209-22 (1980); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 498500 (1981); Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); Tushnet, supra note 34, at

794-97. As one pursues this inquiry, the infinite regress invites another question: What conception of the Framers' intent should inform the construction of these procedures, these evidentiary rules? See Brest, supra, at 222-24; Dworkin, supra, at 476-97; Tushnet, supra note 34,
at 798-804. And as one ponders that question, another surfaces: How does one know that
the Constitution requires a recourse to the original understanding at all? See Brest, supra, at
225-38.
For a brief discussion of the adventures of the infinite regress in normative constitutional
scholarship, see Schlag, Book Review, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY 519, 521-22 (1985). See also
Appendix 4 infra.
48. See Dennis Martinez, supra note 40.

49. This is the classic answer offered by legal positivism. See note 43 supra.
50. See generally Fiss, Objectwity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
51. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 176-258, 410-13.
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epistemological infinite regress is that the stabilization of the split on
one level depends upon our knowing that it has been stabilized on the
previous level, and so on and so forth all the way down. And the farther down we go, the greater the urgency; the stakes are greater, and
still we do not encounter doctrine sufficiently awesome, or theory suffi52
ciently grand, to stop the infinite regress.
Split proliferation. One problem with the discussion above is that my
use of the terms "subjective" and "objective" was hopelessly vague and
loose-perhaps even to the point of error. If this is true, then one way
to clean up the mess above would be to clarify at each step of the regress the sense in which I was using the terms "subjective" and "objective." The hope is that precision and clarity could show that each step
in the argument entailed a different and intelligible use of the terms. If
this were true, and my presentation were indeed sloppy and flawed,
then there really would be no infinite regress.
I think that this suggestion is correct. So let me revise the last section to get rid of the sloppiness: When we say, for instance, that some
standard in tort law is objective, we mean that it is objective in the sense
that it refers to the defendant's actual behavior and that it generally disregards theparticularcharacteristics of the defendant. How do we know
that this standard is objective? The answer is that we have objective
norms to govern legal interpretation, and by objective here we usually
mean stable or neutral. How do we know we have objective norms of
interpretation? The predictable answer is that these objective norms
are reflected in objective institutional practices-and here, objective
typically means demonstrable or shared. The question then becomes...
and the answer is that those institutional practices are objective because
...(and here we get various answers):
because we are always already within these interpretive practices and
could not be53without them (pun seriously intended) (objective as shared
and general).
because there is a grundnorm or master rule of recognition (which,
admittedly, we know little about but are quite certain exists) (objective
as general and demonstrable).
52. At this point, one can regret sneering at the turtles. Indeed, it is very tempting at
this point to resurrect some notion of pragmatism, the sense that even if a few epistemological
screws are loose, nonetheless the legal machinery works fairly well. Lawyers do know how to
draw up security agreements and judges do decide cases in fairly predictable ways-certainly,
far more predictably than this vertiginous description of the infinite regress would suggest.
Indeed, they do.
The interesting question, however, is whether this predictability is attributable to some-

thing that we would want to call law or to something that is (even) harder to locate, identify,
andjustify? Once one asks about the turtles, it's very hard to believe that the answer does not
matter. But achieving closure becomes a matter of rhetoric. And rhetoric is a matter of persuasion, power, authority, audience, and everything that they depend upon, not to mention
53. With apologies to Stanley Fish, who would quite correctly object to the characterization of his approach as objective. See S. FisH, supra note 24, at 14-15.
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because there are disciplining rules which serve to monitor the institutional practices (objective as shared and stable and neutral).
because there are formal and normative constraints on the institutional
practices (objective as ... ?).
One may quibble with my characterization of the various uses of the
term "objective" above. (I wouldn't have it any other way.) The point,
however, is that the subjective/objective split is used in legal discourse
in many different senses. So it is simply false to assume that each time
one encounters at different levels in the argument what seem to be the
same terms (i.e. "subjective" or "objective"), they always mean the
same thing. Thus, one is not entitled to conclude, as I did above, that
splits necessarily yield a linear infinite regress.
I think this revised view is correct. There is no reason to suppose
that a split like subjective/objective always has the same meaning. Indeed, we know that the split refers to a variety of distinctions:
particular/general
mental/physical
unprovable/demonstrable
individual/shared
changeable/stable
biased/neutral
opinion/fact.
And in some sense, this variety of meanings should not be surprising.
If the subjective/objective distinction is truly a split, it should not stand
still. And if legal discourse is composed of a variety of splits each of
which is related to the others in different ways and in different contexts,
then this sort of multi-referential meaning of the split is exactly what
one should expect.
Clarifying the ways in which splits are used may be a helpful exercise. But it will surely not help to stabilize them; on the contrary, just as
subjective/objective can refer us to another split, such as biased/neutral, it must surely be the case that biased/neutral in turn refers to
other splits. Hence, the attempt to stabilize the split through careful
definition of terms has generated a proliferation of splits-each with
infinite regresses of its own. So even though the gravitational pull of
the linear infinite regress has been reduced, things have been made
worse. Indeed, combining the linear infinite regress with split proliferation, we get a proliferation of infinite regresses.
This last thought requires some further modification of the previous
section. The infinite regress is not simply an epistemological regress. It is
not simply the cipher produced by asking how we (can) know something. On the contrary, there are many kinds of infinite regresses.
There is, for instance, the normative infinite regress which requires that

944

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 40:929

each moral justification be justified in turn. 54 There is the explanatory
infinite regress which requires that each explanatory norm be explained
as well. And there are meta infinite regresses as well, which allow us to
move from explanation to normativity to epistemology to linguistics
and back again.
So let me clarify further. The infinite regress implied that it is not
possible to find some foundational level for a particular split. Split
proliferation adds the suggestion that it is impossible to isolate or stabilize any discrete linear regress of splits. On the contrary, each split
sends us to another one. What we appear to get from these moves is a
sort of free play of splits. 55
Split proliferation complicates the attempt to present the legal enterprise as stable or coherent. How does one tell, for instance, when
"objective," at any given level in the analysis, means objective-as-neutral or, instead, objective-as-general? The answer is that the craft of
law entails being able to distinguish one turtle from another.5 6 One
wonders, though, whether craft is sufficiently powerful to keep the turtles separate and distinct, or whether, sooner or later, we will see them
evolve into one huge, unruly reptile. 5 7 But craft is nothing to sneer at.
By facilitating the proliferation of splits, the craft of law makes them
less visible. The sustained proliferation of splits, in turn, makes it much
more difficult to track the infinite regress. Who has the time or the
energy to recognize, much less trace, all these infinite regresses? So in
a sense, the greater the split proliferation, the more difficult it becomes
to trace the turtle tracks. In part, this explains the attraction and appeal
of contextualization for different political constituencies. Contextualization recognizes and embraces split proliferation. In fact, contextualization takes split proliferation to the extreme. And in doing so,
contextualization leaves us in the same situation as other approaches:
There still seems to be no way to stabilize one split with another.5 8
Catch-22. Now, one objection to the presentation above is that it
rests upon the supposition that the only way to stabilize a split, to give
it a fixed meaning in some context, is to use another split. In turn, this
supposition presumes that there is nothing in law or legal discourse but
splits. And this last supposition seems absurd. Quite clearly, some as54. For an exploration of the classic moves in response to the normative infinite regress,
see Leff, Book Review, 29 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1977) (reviewing R. UNGER, supra note I1).
55. The play of splits is so free that the possibility that one split may achieve dominance
(total or partial) cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the concept of the split itself cannot be foundational for otherwise it would have to displace itself.
56. This answer is just the craft turtle-a close relative of interpretive convention and
pragmatism.
57. Say, a lizard, as some irrationalists would have it.
58. For other attempts to show that splits cannot be used to stabilize each other, see
David Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (1985) (elaborately demonstrating the ways in which legal scholars privilege one pole of a split then another by subtly
shifting contexts), and Schlag, supra note 9 (showing how the form of the rule/standard dichotomy undermines the ability to link the rule/standard form to substantive concerns).
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pects of law and legal discourse do not seem like splits: norms such as
craft, for instance, or tradition, consensus, custom, or authorial intent.
To be sure one may quibble with interpretations or applications of
these norms, but that is beside the point: The norms are there to be
consulted. They seem to be whole, to have integrity, to have substance-they deserve the name, "norm." Presumably, then, they can be
invoked to stabilize the splits.
This seems correct and points to a deficiency in the two previous
sections. Both the infinite regress argument and split proliferation
present difficulties for stabilizing splits, but only if we assume that there
is nothing in legal discourse that does not split. And as it is obvious
that there are certain norms which do not appear as splits, it seems
unreasonable to presume that legal discourse is all splits. Of course,
just because a norm seems to have a presence, an integrity, in short, a
name, doesn't necessarily mean that it is not split. For instance, it is
well known, according to one World War II novel, that American combat personnel can be reprieved from flying missions if they are crazy. 5 9
The military norm is clear and, in appearance at least, unequivocal:
Anyone who's crazy must be grounded. 60 And yet anyone who claims
to be crazy and asks to be grounded can't be-he can't be crazy and he
can't be grounded-because a concern for one's safety in time of war is
• . . well, perfectly sane. And so on. 6 1 A recent article by George
Fletcher suggests that this sort of catch-22 has found its way into the
law.

62

Fletcher recently noted that courts sometimes excuse prisoners who
escape in the face of threatened homosexual rape. Sometimes the doctrinal rationale for excuse is that the escape is an involuntary, unblameworthy response to a threat of violence. Fletcher asks us to
suppose that the relevant doctrinal considerations include the defendant's expectation of acquittal at the time of escape. 63 Thus, the greater
a defendant's expectation of conviction, the easier the inference that his
escape was truly lacking in voluntariness or blame.
In one case, as Fletcher notes, prisoner DI escapes to avoid rape
and is acquitted on grounds of involuntariness. (Apparently, the absence of any expectation of acquittal was crucial to the decision in D l's
59. SeeJ. HELLER, CATCH-22 46 (1955).
60. See id.
61.
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern
for one's safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process
of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask;
and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more
missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he was
sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he
didn't want to he was sane and had to.
Id.
62. Fletcher, Paradoxesin Legal Thought, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1263, 1280-84 (1985).
63. Id at 1281.
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case.) If prisoner D2 at some later time faces the same situation and
escapes, he too will be acquitted. Suppose, however, that prior to his
escape, D2 learns of the decision in Dl's case. This bit of knowledge
will lead D2 to conclude that his case is analogous and that an escape
will lead to acquittal. But as soon as D2 makes this realization, he recognizes that his planned escape will seem more voluntary than Dl's
escape: D2 apparently expects acquittal, whereas D1 did not. Hence,
the chances are that D2 Wvill be convicted. But things do not stop here:
D2's newly formed expectation of conviction leads D2 to the happier
conclusion that his escape is involuntary after
all and that therefore he
64
will be acquitted, and so on ad infinitum.
This occurrence seems bizarre. Fletcher's hypothetical sends the
reader (as well as the prisoner) down an infinite hall of mirrors perversely constructed to reflect the opposite of the previous mirror: Selfconsciousness of guilt leads to acquittal and self-consciousness of acquittal leads to guilt. What makes D2's predicament interesting here is
that it is not just the result of some inartful articulation of explicitly
conflicting doctrinal requirements. 6 5 On the contrary, the doctrine in
Fletcher's hypothetical seems clear, whole, and coherent: Prison escapes can be excused upon some showing that the defendant's conduct
was not blameworthy.
Clarity can be deceptive, as the Cretans warned: "One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, the Cretans are always liars,
evil beasts, slow bellies. This witness is true."' 6 6 Like the doctrine in
Fletcher's hypothetical, this warning at first seems clear and whole. Yet
upon further examination, the Cretans' message (like Fletcher's hypo64. Id. at 1280-84. Several authors have addressed this paradox. Dan-Cohen discusses
the paradox as a broader phenomenon stemming from the dual function of single legal directives as decision rules and conduct rules. Decision rules are directed to decisionmakers,
whereas conduct rules are directed to the public. The catch-22 arises when a single legal
directive functions both as a decision rule and a conduct rule and the two carry discordant
meanings. Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in the Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). Hicks applies the catch-22 to three legal problems: the
problem of parliamentary entrenchment (no court may question the binding authority of an
act of Parliament; but what if Parliament enacts some legislation changing that principle with
respect to future legislation?), the problem of whether a declaration by the House of Lords no
longer to treat its decisions as binding is itself binding, and the problem of the rule of renvoi
when it applies to the conflicts laws of a foreign country that are identical. Hicks, The Liar
Paradox in Legal Reasoning, 29 CAMBRIDrE LJ. 275 (1971). Miller discusses the catch-22 in the
context of statements that are inconsistent with an authentic self, e.g. Marx as a member of
the bourgeois class could not advocate that beliefs were class determined. Miller, Book Review, 84 Micr. L. REV. 880, 896-99 (1986).
65. For a discussion of routine catch-22s caused by the unartful creation of doctrine, see
Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 83, 140-42
(1986) (noting that the entanglement prong and the effect prong of the establishment clause
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), establish a catch-22); Developments in the Law:
Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1688 (1987) (student authors) (same).
66. Anderson, St. Paul's Epistle to Titus, in THE PARADOX OF THE LIAR I (R. Martin ed.

1970) (recounting the early history of the paradox of the liar). If the prophet's testimony is
true, then he, as a Cretan, must be a liar. Therefore, his testimony is false.., in which case it
is true.., and so on.
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thetical) yields an infinite alternation of opposite conclusions, "the
liar's paradox." Apparently, this paradox has now wound its way into
the criminal law-or at least into Fletcher's hypothetical.
The doctrine in Fletcher's hypothetical puzzles us in the same manner as the liar's paradox: Both statements have a seemingly straightforward and unified appearance that nonetheless somehow manages to
yield two contradictory conclusions each entailing the other. How is it
that a straightforward, unified statement could produce such a bizarre
hall of mirrors? Yet Fletcher's hypothetical, like the liar's paradox, undeniably does. The doctrine speaks out of both sides of its text to say
opposite things: (1) The doctrine specifies that blameworthiness is a
predicate for conviction and the absence of blameworthiness is a predicate for acquittal. (2) The doctrine also specifies that knowledge of a
likely conviction negates a blameworthy state of mind whereas knowledge of a likely acquittal will yield a blameworthy state of mind. How
does the doctrine accomplish this tour de force? I think it internalizes a
split which we have momentarily forgotten.
This internalized but suppressed split might be described as a difference between what the doctrine means and what the doctrine does. Or,
to be more precise, I will use J. L. Austin's categories of constative and
performative utterances. 67 A constative utterance ("the sun is out today") simply describes a state of affairs and is either true or false. A
performative utterance (like the words "I do" at a marriage ceremony),
by contrast, has some operative significance; it functions as an action
and is neither true nor false. 68 Instead, it is, roughly speaking, (more
or less) effective. 69 Making liberal use of these categories, it is possible
70
to speak of the constative and performative significance of a statement.
For instance, in Fletcher's hypothetical, the doctrine has both constative and performative significance with respect to the defendant's state
of mind. The constative significance of the doctrine is that if D2 can
truthfully say, "I have a clean state of mind," then D2 should not be
convicted. The performative significance of D2's articulation of the
doctrine, however, is the converse; the expectation of acquittal reduces
(or even negates) D2's involuntariness-and thus yields a guilty state of
mind. The paradox arises because we forget about the performative
significance of the doctrine and yet the performative significance of the
7
doctrine works to reverse the meaning of its constative significance. 1
67. The terms are borrowed from J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 1-15
(1975). Ultimately, Austin rejects the possibility of locating or identifying the distinction between performative and constative utterances. Id. at 55-91, 144-45; see also note 70 infra.
68. Id at 1-15.
69. Id. at 14.
70. Austin does not do this but instead rejects the distinction between performative and
constative utterances in favor of more refined distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary,

and perlocutionary acts. Id. at 55-91, 144-45.
71. For further discussion of the catch-22 in terms of constative and performative significance, see Appendix 2 infra.
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The puzzle arises because the doctrine looks clear, whole, and coherent, yet nonetheless internalizes a split we have partially forgotten.
72
This account, of course, does not resolve Fletcher's hypothetical.
In fact, it's not even a very good explanation: As previously suggested,
split proliferation casts serious doubt upon the possibility of using one
split to stabilize another, for there will always be another way to draw
the distinction. And indeed, this is true here as well. 73 Instead of using
Austin's categories of constative and performative significance, it's also
possible to say that we tend to think of the doctrine as
symbolic meaning,
content,
proposition,
while forgetting that the doctrine is also
causal force,
textuality,
74
action.
In short, what is crucial is that the doctrine should operate in two
modes (though these two modes can be described in various ways).
The paradox arises because the mode we have forgotten about is structured so as to reverse the meaning or effect of the one we remember.
We have quite literally forgotten about the splits, while they mercilessly
wreak havoc on our consciousness by sending it in opposite
75
directions.
From a legal perspective, however, the interesting question posed
by Fletcher's hypothetical is whether a catch-22 between what law means
(i.e. constative significance) and what law does (i.e. performative significance) can be stabilized. One classic move to stabilize this split is to
suggest that, in law at least, meaning governs consequence, so the latter need not be considered at all. This amusing strategy, which was
championed by the legal formalists, basically privileges one prong of
the split, meaning, by sending the other prong, consequence, into ex72. Indeed, as one commentator notes, the paradox of the liar is not generally deemed
resolved. See Kaye, A First Look at "Second-Order Evidence, " 66 B.U.L. REv. 701, 706 (1986).
For a sample of recent literature on the paradox, see RECENT ESSAYS ON TRUTH AND THE LIAR
PARADOX (R. Martin ed. 1984). The solutions offered in set theory that depend upon banishing self-referential statements (like the liar's paradox) do not seem to be available in less
formal discourses such as law. Cf D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL
GOLDEN BRAID

22 (1979).

73. Compare, for instance, Fletcher's account of the catch-22, which locates it in the
antinomy of self-consciousness, with Dan-Cohen's account, which locates the paradox in the
attempt of doctrine to address two different audiences at once, the decisionmakers and the lay
public. See note 64 supra.
74. At other times, we will remember the causal force, textuality, and action of law and
will forget its symbolic meaning, content, and propositional character.
75. Consciousness can mean and consciousness can cause. But it is not in control of all
the consequences that stem from its act of meaning nor does it always mean everything that its
meaning causes. See F. DosToEvsKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND (1974) (depicting the unhappy state of self-consciousness).
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ile. 76 The predictable response was to bring consequence back to the
center of legal discourse and send the formalists into exile-which is
precisely what the legal realists did. 77 They too, however, made some
amusing contributions to the control of the split: Some of them argued
that the meaning of a legal decision is its consequence-so let's not
worry too much about what the words mean. 78 The problem with this
approach is that legal decisions continue to mean despite their consequences. 79 Another time-honored favorite is the view that in law,

meaning and consequence are one and the same. This view was a real
hit in the early "illegal advocacy" prosecutions in the United States at
the beginning of the twentieth century: The courts proceeded on the
assumption that intent proves meaning, which proves effect (and of

course vice versa).8 0

In legal discourse, catch-22s generally trace the types of splits mentioned above. 8 1 The history of these intellectual moves to stabilize the
76. This banishment of consequence fits with the formalist view of law as a closed, selfsufficient, and structured deductive system. See, e.g., Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in
Tw, ntteth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory
About Lau, and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861, 866-68 (1981); see also L. FRIEDMAN, A HISToRY
oF AMERICAN L W 617 (2d ed. 1985) (labeling Langdell's science of law "geology without
rocks," and "astronomy without stars").
77. See, e.g., Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809 (1935).
78. Perhaps it was just the exuberance of novelty and iconoclasm, but Felix Cohen, for
one, did at times seem to go this far in advocating a consequentialist theory of legal meaning.
"ITIhe problem of the judge is not whether a legal rule or concept actually exists but whether
it ought to exist." Id. at 841 (emphasis in original).
79. Summers notes that consequentialists view the realization of values in causal terms.
Summers points out that law is not merely causal and that one of the ways it serves to realize
values is simply by being in accordance with the norms of right behavior. See Summers, supra
note 76, at 945.
80. Thus, in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), the text of the "illegal advocacy" served both to show the likely effect of the speech and the intent of the defendants.
Effect served to demonstrate intent and, of course, vice versa. The defendants argued that
they only intended to prevent injury to the cause of the Russian Revolution. The Court disposed of this argument by noting, on the basis of the "illegal" circulars printed by the defendants, that the "plan of action which they adopted necessarily involved ... defeat of the war
program of the United States." Id. at 621. Thus the text of the circulars established, not
merely the likely, but the necessary effect of the plan. If "[mien must be held to have intended, and to be accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely to produce," then
certainly it seems legitimate to conclude that, here, they acted "for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating the military plans of the [United States] government in Europe."
Id. at 621, 623; cf A. KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT NOON (1941) (a work of fiction in which Stalinist
interrogators assume that an objective counterrevolutionary must have subjectively intended
to be counterrevolutionary).
81. One pattern of catch-22 is so prevalent in law that it warrants special mention. Legal
directives often aim to affect certain behavior in some way. In order to accomplish its aim, the
legal directive must describe that behavior. A problem arises, however, because persons subject to the legal directive retain a freedom to alter their behavior so as to avoid, neutralize, or
minimize the intended effect of the legal directive. Bankruptcy law provides a good example:
Because it remains within the power of the potentially bankrupt individual to precipitate or
delay the technical act of bankruptcy, it is difficult (if not impossible) for the law to define acts
of bankruptcy that correspond to the moral or economic "state" of bankruptcy. See Weisberg,
supra note 45, at 44, 51, 90. For further examples and discussion of this "feedback loop," see
Schlag, supra note 12, at 957-62. This catch-22 can lead to a stereotypical form of argument
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split between what the law does and what it means does not give cause
for optimism. Consider, then, the extremely pessimistic hypothesis
that Fletcher's hypothetical, rather than presenting a special case, states
the general rule. One reason this might be is that law is both what it
means and what it does. And the two are rarely (if ever) consonant. On
the other hand, rarely are the meanings and structures of legal discourse sufficiently rigid to produce the incoherence achieved in
Fletcher's hypothetical.8 2 To achieve such perfect incoherence would
entail locating a split that could be stabilized so as to always yield perfect contradiction. Both split proliferation and the infinite regress
make such rigidity unlikely. In fact, it would be surprising if the split
between what law does and what law means always caused a perfect
catch-22. The reason is simple: It would mean that the realm of meaning and interpretation would be so systematically weak that we could
never interpret our way out of these types of paradoxes. And, this is
not true-neither generally, nor in Fletcher's hypothetical. By relying
on interpretive techniques, we can clearly avoid the paradox in
Fletcher's hypothetical-we can, for instance, interpret the doctrine so
that the defendant's expectation of acquittal is irrelevant to his state of
mind. Indeed, the only reason it is a paradox for us is that we are willing to entertain it as such simply for the intellectual pleasure of confronting the possibility.8 3 (I doubt that many trial lawyers or trial court
84
judges would spend sleepless nights worrying about the paradox. )
More typical of legal discourse, then, is an attenuated version of the
catch-22-where each side of the split antagonizes (rather than annihilates) the other. The description of affirmative action offered by its opponents provides an example. Suppose that doctrine states that
affirmative action can be used to remedy past discrimination. One of
the predicates for allowing affirmative action is some showing that the
group has suffered discrimination. The better one can show that the
group has been discriminated against, the more likely it is that an affirmative action program will be established. But here's the catch. The
very demonstration of the fact of discrimination can yield a perverse
implication: Namely, some will think that because the group has been
discriminated against, it has sustained discriminatory harm and is less
qualified. This perverse implication can be seen to perpetuate discrimipitting the virtues of "the bright line rule" against "the flexible standard." See generally M.
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987); Kennedy, Form and Substance in
PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Schlag, supra note 9.
82. Thus, a perfect catch-22 requires that a legal directive be susceptible to only those
interpretations that render it perfectly contradictory. And rarely is it the case, in law, that
there are such strictures on interpretation-especially given that a premium is placed on
avoiding self-contradictory interpretations. See Appendix 2 infra.
83. See Fletcher, supra note 62, at 1284 (noting that the significance of the paradox is
primarily theoretical, as opposed to practical).
84. Although they might in those situations that fall within the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1503
(1982) (provisions on obstruction ofjustice).

April 1988]

CANIBAL MOVES

nation.8 5 To avoid this result, the decisionmaker should refrain from
demonstrating that a group has sustained discriminatory harm. But if
for granting afthe decisionmaker follows this tack, then the predicate
86
firmative action may not be satisfied. And so on.
Now, if the double role of legal texts such as
constative yet performative,
symbolic yet causal,
content yet textual, and
propositions yet actions,
can yield catch-22s, then the integrity and wholeness of purportedly
stable norms such as craft, consensus, custom, or authorial intent must
be reconsidered. It turns out that these norms speak out of both sides
of their text.
For instance, consider the significance and implications of a possible
adoption of constitutional intentionalism by the Supreme Court. The
constative significance of this position, most simply, is that the Constitution means whatever the Framers intended; yet its performative significance is to free contemporary Justices from existing case law and
existing interpretive procedures to refashion the Constitution in their
own image. The symbolic significance of a call for constitutional intentionalism in constitutional interpretation can be described as a conservative return to the intellectual roots of the republic; yet its causal
significance would be a radical (perhaps adventuristic) exercise in constitutional reconstruction. The content of constitutional intentionalism
is to require that constitutional decisions conform with the intent of the
Framers; yet its textual significance is to exclude any but legal-historical
arguments about the meaning of the Constitution. As a proposition, intentionalism simply states a position on what the Constitution means;
yet as action, this proposition essentially transfers power to those (narrow) political and academic interests that are committed to the legalhistorical interpretation of the text.
Now, certainly, one can disagree with this description of the character of the intentionalist position. And I think such disagreement would
be justified: The intentionalist stance cannot be said to have, for instance, just one constative meaning or just one performative significance.
And that's precisely the point: Stable norms such as authorial intent
(or consensus or tradition) are not terribly stable. On the contrary,
they internalize the types of splits described above (e.g. constative versus performative).
What is more, these purportedly stable norms can crumble under
85. See T. SOWELL, BLACK EDUCATION: MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES 292 (1972). This catch-22
hardly presents a killer argument against affirmative action. For one thing, it is not so much
an argument against affirmative action, as an argument against ever finding that stigmatized
groups have sustained discriminatory harm. For other responses, see R. Kennedy, Persuasion
and Dtstrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1327, 1330-31 (1986).
86. See Appendix 2 infra.
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scrutiny because each of them in its own way reproduces the world of
turtles and split proliferation. Thus, within a convention, one would
expect to find certain assertions not just about substance, but about
interpretation and epistemology and ontology and so on: the usual
line-up of turtles with, of course, the proliferation of ways to describe
87
the little animals.
The Overkill. Now, one could object that this presentation of the
catch-22, while interesting, is nonetheless quite flawed in one respect.
Granted that there may be some reason to think that Fletcher's paradox
is more common and more sweeping than he suggests, nonetheless, the
account above of the catch-22 is simply too extreme. It goes too far in
suggesting that legal doctrine and legal theory are at war (or in tension)
with themselves.
Once one realizes that, indeed, the account exaggerates, one immediately recognizes why this should have happened. The section above
on the catch-22 seems to privilege the idea of contradiction. Thus, any
time some actual distinction between the meaning of a doctrine and its
consequences emerges, the previous section immediately seizes upon
the difference to suggest that there is a contradiction. But difference
does not necessarily signify contradiction-unless some master rule
says it does. But I have not offered any grounds for thinking that such a
master rule exists. Indeed, if it did, then the strong version of the catch22 would be correct, and the master rule would automatically
destabilize itself.
I think that these objections are correct. At most, then, the catch-22
merely states that stable norms are susceptible to internal disruption.
(It does not, and indeed could not, say that stable norms are always
disrupted.) This weaker version of the catch-22 seems much more consistent with how lawyers experience legal doctrine, norms, and concepts: These legal artifacts do not invariably shatter as soon as they are
used-far from it. And any theory or approach which suggests that
they do invariably shatter would suffer from overkill. Indeed, the erroneous suggestion that legal discourse always entails a perfect catch-22 suffers from overkill. That suggestion seems implausible-for the reason
that most of us do not experience norms such as convention or custom
shattering every time we refer to them. Moreover, the strong version of
the catch-22 transforms every difference into a contradiction. This
makes contradiction a foundational principle-which is absurd precisely because contradiction would have to unseat itself every time it
became foundational: So to repeat, a theory that suggests that legal
concepts or norms invariably shatter suffers from overkill.
87. For an example of a clever deployment of the catch-22 within the structure of the
purportedly stable norm of "the Framers' intent," see Powell, The Original Understanding of
OriginalIntent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985) (arguing that the Framers did not intend that the
Court interpret the Constitution in terms of the Framers' intent).
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By the same token, any theory that suggests that there are legal concepts or norms that are not susceptible to destabilization also suffers
from overkill. That sort of theory would privilege the wholeness, the
coherence, and the integrity of certain legal concepts-and we still have
no reason to do that. The splits are still free.
One of the reasons that they remain free is precisely because of the
overkill. Indeed, the catch-22 is only one of the ways by which an internalized split will erupt-the overkill is another. Like the catch-22, the
overkill works with our studied inattention. The overkill occurs when
some stable norm is extended to a domain where it has no business
being.
When Posner, for instance, starts to explain marital love in terms of
efficiency and the reduction of transaction costs, we sense overkill.8 8
Love, after all, does not easily reduce to transaction-cost avoidance.
With this thought, we begin to wonder what is wrong with Posner's
attempts to extend microeconomics to this domain. And with that
question the mechanics of the Posnerian enterprise begin to surface.
We realize that it does not matter at all what part of social life Posner
reviews; his economic mechanics will always be the same.8 9 The
microeconomic concepts are always related in the same structured way
and can be applied to any aspect of life. Why? We find the answer by
thinking about love in connection with transaction costs. What has Posner suppressed? By thinking about Posner's treatment of love, one begins to realize that throughout his enterprise, Posner's enterprise
suppresses the realm of significance and aesthetics that supports and is
supported by the reciprocal construction of social life and social
meaning. 90
Legal discourse is pregnant with possibilities for overkill. Tremendous harm can go unredressed at the very whisper of the concept of
"free choice." 9 1 Cruelty can be perpetrated with the supposition that
92
men are capable of protecting their own interests in a free market.
Each of these statements describes a situation where the economics of
concepts such as choice or free-market ordering are stretched to their
limits. Over time, this conceptual strain can generate the emergence of
the splits. Indeed, the overkill works by overextending one part of the
submerged split to such an extent that the split surfaces and the inter88. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 127-30.
89. Schlag, supra note 12, at 933-45 (discussing the mechanical structure of Posner's

brand of law and economics).
90. Id. at 933-62.
91. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (asserting that the "badge of
inferiority" associated with enforced separation of the races is simply a "construction" chosen
by blacks).
92. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (asserting that bakery employees are perfectly capable of asserting their rights and taking care of themselves without the
protecting arm of the state).
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nalization or suppression of the split is revealed-all down the line.9 3
Summary. There is something very strange about these four moves.
If one takes them seriously, one is left with an utterly bizarre conception of law and legal discourse-one that goes like this: Splits are not
subject to control. There is no place outside the splits. And there is no
top split. All that's left is the interpenetrated free play of splits. There
is neither foundation nor rational order in law or legal discourse. As
for legal doctrine, it is the record of failed attempts to control the splits.
This, of course, seems to be an impossible vision of law and legal
discourse. The very articulation of this view invites a search for the
wrong turn. What is wrong with the four moves? One possibility is
that they only threaten legal rationality if one assumes the existence of
splits. The account of the four moves itself depends upon the presence
of contradiction. And if there is no contradiction, then the four moves
are relatively powerless.
There is much to be said for this view. Simply because legal discourse exhibits a passion for distinction and difference hardly means
that it is riddled with contradiction. A distinction is not necessarily a
contradiction. There is a difference in constitutional law between private and state action. Does this difference state a contradiction? The
question is how can we tell? And the answer, typically, is that we have
to examine the uses made of the distinction, as well as the ends which it
is designed to serve. But, this procedure will not work, for it simply
invites the infinite regress. The very possibility of developing a rule of
recognition that would enable us to distinguish a mere distinction from
a split is in question.
One wonders then whether this constant questioning is not the
product of a commitment to a perverse hyperrationalism-a demand
for a reason so pure that no system of discourse could possibly fulfill its
requirements. Indeed, the account of the four moves above seems to
demand a foundationalist grounding of legal discourse in reason. And
each time reason fails, the splits re-emerge. Surely something is wrong
with posing the issue in this way. After all, it is possible that a reason
anchored in experience or interpretive convention
or institutional his94
tory might allow the splits to be stabilized.
93. Moreover, it is quite possible that the experience of constant overkill in legal discourse (the constant abuse and overuse of legal concepts and doctrine) could itself lead to the
rejection of the view that law is based upon a set of integrated wholes such as concepts, rules,
and principles. Instead, this constant overkill could lead to a view of law as a field of constantly rearranging splits-each never fully present to the other. But obviously one can only
stretch the concept of overkill so far. For an attempt to demonstrate this sort of strain on
philosophical concepts and to precipitate this sense of systemic overkill, seeJ. DERRIDA, White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 207-29 (1982) (suggesting that the language of philosophy is on loan and that the loan is both usurious and used
up).
94. Obviously, there are many other metaphors (besides "anchor") by which one might
describe the pragmatic insistence on a connection between reason and experience: reason
embedded in or immanent in experience; reason permeating experience; the reason ofexperi-
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I think that this suggestion is correct. The problem is that even
though the suggestion is correct, it doesn't help. All it suggests is that
so long as our experience, our interpretive conventions, and our institutional history are stable, the splits can be stabilized. The suggestion
can make no claims about the stability of experience, interpretive convention, or institutional history. These are not (and on this account
could not be) governed by any reason we could know about. What is
more, once reason is referred to experience, culture, or interpretive
convention, the question becomes whether these are themselves experienced as split.
Now, none of this establishes that a more pragmatic conception of
reason cannot be invoked to stabilize the splits. But, it does show that
an appeal to a more pragmatic conception of reason will not suffice to
demonstrate that the splits are or can be stabilized. Even if experience,
interpretive convention, or institutional history could support reason in
stabilizing the splits, we could not know it. Now, one might answer that
this epistemological demand is itself a symptom of the dreaded hyperrationalism. And one could add that it is not necessary to know that a
stabilizing solution is correct. Now, one could say all of these things,
but it is difficult to see how they would help.
Who has the burden of proof? Have we any reason to suppose that
context, convention, or experience helps reason to stabilize the splits?
Well, actually, we do. When we examine the case law, we do not often
have the impression that judges are rendering totally unpredictable decisions or offering totally off-the-wall arguments. This observation
doesn't help, of course, for the same observation could well be true
even if reason dropped out entirely. It proves too much-overkill.
Is this hyperrationalism again? Well, yes. But the problem is that it
is not possible to find a rationalism that is at once (a) not hyper and
(b) not supported by the uncertain twists and turns of experience, culture, convention, etc. As soon as one attempts to reacquaint reason
with the practical, the capacity of reason to stabilize the splits is again
placed in question.
One wonders whether this account does not establish a burden for
reason that it could not possibly meet. I think in some sense this account does do precisely that. Perhaps, then the burden should be
placed elsewhere. Perhaps we should demand, as John Stick recently
did, that any attempt to demonstrate the irrationality (or arationality) of
legal discourse should show that law cannot possibly be rational. 9 5 The
ence; and so on. But in each instance, reason is combined with something else (i.e. experience, culture, convention, or institutional history). And this combination allows the four
moves to drive some troublesome wedges between and within the two.
95. Stick argues that the efforts of Singer to demonstrate the irrationalist dimension of
legal discourse fail because Singer invokes Cartesian standards of rationality that are external
to law (and which most of us do not believe in any case). Stick then argues that Singer's
arguments miss their mark because the legal community rejects Cartesian rationality in favor
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problem with this stance, however, is that we just showed that reason is
incapable of making such demonstrations. Stick's burden is impossible
to satisfy as well. If neither side can meet the ideal burden of persuasion, then where should the burden be set?
This sounds like an impossible question. It suggests that we should
not be asking about burdens of persuasion at all. What is the point
when it seems that no one does (or could) know what's going on? Of
course, this is precisely the situation where burdens of persuasion are
necessary: when the evidence or the argument itself cannot meet the
ideal of certainty. If it were so clear that the partisans of pragmatism
are right, that reason anchored in experience can stabilize the splits,
then there would be no need for them to appeal to a burden of
persuasion.
Where should the burden be set, then? Perhaps this is the wrong
question-a symptom of, rather than a cure for, the four moves. Indeed, this epistemological preoccupation with burdens of persuasion
suggests that the mistake is not so much a demand for hyperrationalism
but something broader, more fundamental. Perhaps the mistake was in
the turn towards epistemology? I think this suggestion has some merit.
After all, the four moves above depend upon our desire to know that
the splits can be or are stabilized. But why should we care whether we
know? Why should one care whether it is reason or experience that
of a pragmatic, contextual, shared view of rationality that stresses analogy, principles, practical reasoning, and coherence theories of truth. Compare Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100
HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986), with Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE LJ. 1 (1984).
Even if Stick were right that Singer has missed his mark (and from a pragmatic standpoint, that depends upon the practices of, not just the iconography invoked by, the legal community), it is not clear that Stick has established his point: Two questions remain.
The first question is one that pits substance against form. It's all fine and well to champion a pragmatic, contextual, shared view of rationality that stresses analogy, principles, practical reasoning, and coherence theories of truth. Make no mistake; as reasoning goes, this is
great substance. There remains, however, that small question of form: Is this view of rationality itself held, used, andpracticed in a pragmatic, contextual way that stresses principles and all
that other good stuff? Or are pragmatism, contextualism, principles, etc., simply a new altar
to which one pays the same old formalistic, ritualistic homage? My point, quite simply, is that
what matters from a pragmatic perspective is not just what is believed, but how it is believed
and how those beliefs are used.
The second question goes to the nature of this pragmatic, contextual, shared view of
rationality that stresses principles and so forth: Does this conception of rationality exhibit the
characteristics of something we would want to call rationality? See note 96 infra.
And this question does matter quite a bit-for our faith (if any) that the legal system
"works" and produces just results seems to depend upon a demonstration that it is indeed
"rational." Now, the fact that it may not be rational is hardly a killer argument against the
legitimacy or effectiveness of the legal system. One could, for instance, attempt to defend the
legitimacy of the legal system on the grounds that it's good literature. And there are certainly
some very provocative works which explore this possibility. See, e.g., J.B. WHITE, HERACLES'
Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); Cover, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). But for most people
(within and without the legal academy), poetic excellence is generally not the first thing that
comes to mind in answering the question, "What makes law effective or legitimate?" By contrast, rationality will often be invoked in answering that question.
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controls the splits so long as something keeps them in line? 9 6 Perhaps
this epistemological demand is superfluous and objectionable. Stick
certainly thinks it is when he suggests that the epistemological turn prevents the discussion of what really matters: politics. 9 7 But, his argu-

ment depends upon a burden of persuasion which he establishes for
98
those who argue that, in law, reason is not exactly in the driver's seat.
Indeed, Stick seems to want a rational demonstration that law could not
possibly be rational. 99 This is somewhat ironic. First, it is ironic because the burden he establishes is precisely the mirror image of the
hyperrationalism we discussed above, which he roundly condemns. 10 0
Second, it is ironic because we just decided that burdens are established here because epistemology is not decisive on the issue. Indeed,
burdens are established precisely because we do not know what is going on and yet we want to win the argument. That sort of enterprise
might well be called politics.
So, let's recapitulate. The search for the wrong turn in the account
of the four moves led to an inquiry about whether it was improper to
privilege the splits. And it was decided that, indeed, it is improper to
privilege splits-just as it's improper to privilege coherence. Next, the
inquiry turned to a question about whether the account does not depend upon an unappealing image of rationality-namely, hyperrationalism. And the answer was yes-this all depends upon a sustained
commitment to a particular vision of rationality as hyperrationalism.
Of course, it is not possible to identify a rationalism that is neither
(a) hyper nor (b) related to the support/treachery of experience, culture, or convention. Next, it was asked whether the account does not,
by requiring reasons to rise to hyperrationalism, establish a burden of
96. There are obviously lots of reasons to care about the answer. One reason is that
most of us think that the legitimacy and effectiveness of the legal enterprise require that it be
demonstrably rational. Another reason is that "experience," "convention," "common sense,"
"good judgment," etc., are inadequate constraints upon the splits unless they do something
more than assert that they can fill the gaps and harmonize the contradictions.
Appeals to common sense, to practical reason, to pragmatism, or to the like, tend to
come at the last moments of the debate-when it is evident that there is no other way to make
sense of the contradictions that have emerged. In prior centuries, people would use the term
"God" at the same point in the debate. And this parallel is apt, for appeals to "pragmatism"
and constructs of that ilk in explaining or validating the legal enterprise have an uncanny
tendency to lapse into mysticism. The most "pragmatic" aspect of pragmatism is its negative
stance towards conceptualism, essentialism, and claims of absolute knowledge. See R. RORTY,
CONSEQUJENCES OF PRAGMATISM 162-66 (1982).
97. Stick, supra note 95, at 389-401. Stick's argument is puzzling: Epistemology is political. And his own arguments confirm this. His impassioned plea for a scholarly turn away
from epistemology and towards politics is supported, not by "political" arguments, but by
arguments that are epistemological from beginning to end.
98. "As such, irrationalists must show that the legal predictability stems from either a
consciously duplicitous system or one in which lawyers rely unconsciously on arguments that
cannot be explicitly stated and still be followed." Id. at 358.
99. If one were actually to succeed in making such a demonstration, however, one would
have failed-another example of the catch-22.
100. See Stick, supra note 95, at 356-62; note 95 supra.
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persuasion for reason that it cannot possibly meet. And the answer
was, yes it does. The next question, then, was where the burden of
persuasion should be set. And the answer is that this question itself
depends upon a resolution of the issue which the burden of persuasion
is itself supposed to help resolve. Now, one could no doubt go on and
on looking for the wrong turn. But that would be overkill and would
only yield split proliferationat best. And if reason cannibalizes itself (as I
have suggested), then surely it invites the catch-22 and the infinite regress
to enlist reason in the fight against cannibalism.
Conclusion. What I have tried to do here is describe some moves of
reasoning that seem to sway contemporary legal consciousness. At its
most simple, this article is a presentation of some legal reasoning
moves that have become common in contemporary legal discourse. I
have tried to show that these moves are already at work shaping law and
legal discourse. They cannot be blamed upon some foreign philosophical intervention in the text of law. They are, in a very real sense, our
moves.
Not surprisingly, they are rather widespread in legal discourse. The
infinite regress, for instance, is not just the persistent repetition of the
question, "How do we know that?," but also the structure of some common patterns in the development of the positive law: It describes, for
instance, the repeated efforts of the Court to find a baseline for the
articulation of constitutional rights." ° 1 Sometimes, one can even see
glimmers of the infinite regress within a single judicial opinion. °2 The
baseline problem, for instance, was raised by Justice Brennan to question means/ends analysis in free speech cases where the government
seeks to justify regulation on aesthetic grounds.iO3 There must be
some baseline to delimit and verify the substantiality of governmental
ends, because if there isn't then means/ends analysis becomes an exercise in circularity. Determination of the baseline, of course, refers to all
sorts of other inquiries about the substance of constitutional entitlements, institutional merits, interpretive considerations, and other inquiries opened by the infinite regress. 10 4 Split proliferation is not simply
the multiplicity of possible meanings that can be attributed to the dichotomies found within a text. It also describes what has happened in
the past sixty years to a fairly simple legal directive that provides, "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech .... 1i5 The
101. For discussion, see Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
102. This will not happen often because the infinite regress tends to undermine the
rhetoric ofjudicial self-presentation in opinions.
103. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 824-29 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. See Sunstein, supra note 101. One can even question whether there should be a
baseline at all. Id. at 918. For further discussion, see Appendix 4 infra.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. I. For an illuminating display of the proliferation of distinctions in the free speech clause, see Van Alstyne, A GraphicReview of the Free Speech Clause, 70
CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982).
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catch-22 is not just the liar's paradox applied to a hypothetical case of
parliamentary entrenchment in England. It is the problem of the multiplication and the internal fragmentation of individual rights and the
corresponding breakdown of the political community that sustains
these rights. 10 6 And overkill is not simply the exuberance of exaggeration. It is the revenge of dualism against the temptations of the monisthe
tic form-regardless of whether that monism bears the name1 0 of
7
Absolute, reason, convention, pragmatism, or good judgment.
I have laid out these moves in an abstract (hence visible) manner so
that they might be recognizable across a wide array of substantive contexts. My thought is that it is helpful to understand these patterns of
legal reasoning because so much of our "substantive" disagreements
inhabit these patterns of form.10 8 Much as we like to think that form
follows substance, there may well be more truth to the view that it is the
other way around.1 0 9
In part, this is because of the reflexive character of legal argument.
Law and legal discourse (like other forms of symbolic activity) have a
reflexive quality. In other words, the language we use in legal discourse
to justify our positions, to state our goals, to announce our intentions
has a tendency to circle back and alter the very statements we make.
The cannibal moves show how this reflexive character can produce
rather bizarre results.
Now, it could be objected that this article establishes nothing of the
sort. Nowhere are my first principles clearly laid out (a failure ofjustification). Moreover, my terms have not been clearly defined (a lack of
precision). The perspective I bring to bear seems to keep shifting (a
failure to present an articulate perspective). And there seems to be an
absence of a recognizable order in my account (a lack of coherence).
Well, maybe. But then again, consider that the search for first principles triggers the infinite regress; the insistence on precision begets split
proliferation;the announcement of a privileged perspective on the meaning or function of a discourse invites the catch-22; and as for the demand for coherence, this drive to subsume more and more of the world
(or law) into an acceptable order-well, that might be called overkill.
So it turns out that there's another point: The virtues that we demand of legal discourse (justification, precision, articulate perspective,
and coherence) have their other (often unintended) side. Respectively,
these might be called infinite regress, split proliferation, catch-22, and
overkill. Accordingly, this article might be read as a demonstration of
the results produced when an individual or an entire community insists
too much on justification, precision, articulate perspective, and coher106. Schlag, supra note 12, at 957-59.
107. For a demonstration of how the moves can be used as an entry point into the understanding of the ideological dimensions of law and legal discourse, see Appendix 3 infra.
108. See Appendix 3 infra.
109. See Schlag, supra note 9.
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ence in a discourse (like law) that regulates social life: Just about anything can happen.
Perhaps this is the right conclusion. But it seems overstated. Perhaps the problem is simply that legal reasoning produces these bizarre
results when it is not turned to a real object, but encounters only itself.
This article could be read as a demonstration of this point as well. The
point has obvious implications for the legal community: As members of
a service industry devoted to the manipulation of endless webs of intricately intertwined texts, it may be doubted whether many of us often
encounter anything (professionally) that might actually qualify as a real
object." I 0
Ironically, there is a sense in which everybody already knows all this.
Indeed, a number of strategies have already emerged in (conscious, or
less than conscious) response to the situation I have described in this
article. In fact, the responses have already been voiced by contemporary legal scholars:
a) One approach is to conclude that it is inappropriate to insist too
much on justification, precision, articulate perspective, and coherence.
These virtues are the aesthetics of a text (a theoretical text). Law, however, is a practical activity, not just a text. This sort of claim can be
advanced under the banner of pragmatism, conventionalism, or professionalism. This seems to be a strategy championed (not surprisingly)
by the political center.
b) Another approach is denial. None of this is really happening-it's
just a bunch of intellectual loonies (like me) who are painting these
absurd pictures for God knows what purpose. The real problem is that
we have lost our way; we are not insisting hard enough on the traditional virtues. We should all return to (or adopt) one or another of the
available fundamental, precise, articulate, and coherent texts and follow it rigorously. Authorial intent or microeconomics, for instance,
might fit this bill. This is an approach which seems rather popular on
the right.
c) A third approach is to try (as I have) to point all this out. This
strategy entails pointing out the limits and implications of the state of
affairs just described. ' I' Many of the people who adopt this approach
seem to be on the left.
To end on a speculative, indeed cannibalistic note, I want to say a
few things about what is missing from this article. I started out to write
an article about legalform. So at the outset, I dismissed substance from
the scene." 2 I also buried history in a footnote very near the beginning. 1 3 Seemingly missing from this article is a sense of how these
110. See notes 112-120 infra and accompanying text.
111. For another example of this approach (within the pages of this issue), see Frug,
Argument as Character,40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988).
112. See text accompanying notes 4-5 supra.
113. See note 7 supra.
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cannibal moves relate to current social practice. I think there is a reason for that-one which is reflected in my summary dismissals-and I
think it has to do with the form that dominates current social practice:
namely, bureaucracy. Increasingly, life and work experiences occur
within this or that consumer or producer bureaucracy. Increasingly,
the objects of work consist of servicing bureaucratically defined objectives, according to bureaucratically sanctioned procedures. The refinement, expansion, and increasing rationalization of the bureaucratic
form is not socially (or intellectually) weightless: Over time, it yields
the accelerating mutability of meaning, 1 14 the increased insularity and
specialization of knowledges, 1 15 the heightened instrumentalization of
cultural symbols and values,' 6 the fetishism of instrumentalism,' 17 and
the proliferation of complexity and fragmentation.' 8 In this sort of
world,"1 9 it should not be surprising to find that substance offers little
(if any) resistance to form. And
it should also not be surprising that
20
form becomes cannibalistic.'

114. Hence, the current crisis of epistemology and interpretation in legal scholarship.
Hence, also, the appeal and plausibility of deconstruction.
115. Hence, the turn among academics toward theory and the turn of theory against
itself.
116. Hence, the gradual erasure of substantive boundaries between law, philosophy,
literature, economics, etc., as well as the erosion of stable meaning systems. The formal
boundaries, however, seem to have more staying power. For instance, even though legal academics use economic or philosophical texts, nonetheless these are often used in distinctly
legal ways (i.e., to serve as authority or to prescribe (rather incredibly) solutions to concrete
legal problems).
At its most simple, the instrumentalization of cultural values and symbols means that
these values and symbols are redefined and recombined in accordance with the instrumental
needs of the institution or the enterprise. The result is a devaluation of the linguistic and
cultural currency.
117. Hence, the dominance of prescriptive or normative modes of thought in legal
scholarship.
118. Hence, the difficulty of saying anything true, appealing, useful, or good that is also
general.
119. This sort of world bears some resemblance to the Weberian nightmare. For discussion, see Trubek, Ma Weber's Tragic Modernism and the Study of Law in Society, 20 LAw & Soc'y
REv. 573 (1986).
120. For a discussion of some of these ideas on the terrain of the "self," see Schlag,
supra note 24.
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LIST OF SPLITS

slavery
constraint
coercion
necessity
determinism
other

freedom
choice
consent
rational
free will
self

public
other-regarding
visible
collective
official

private
self-regarding
intimate
individual
non-governmental

objective
physical
demonstrable
shared
neutral
fact
general
stable

subjective
mental
unprovable
individual
biased
opinion
particular
changeable

absolute
categorical
strong

conditional
balancing
weak

substantial
direct
core
essential

insubstantial
indirect
peripheral
formality

substance
procedure
outcome
process
content
form
This list is by no means a complete catalog of the major splits in
legal discourse. Nonetheless, it illustrates how this encyclopedic project might be undertaken.
There are several ways to read this list. First, and most simply, one
can read it from left to right and then down, in which case it is simply a
list of some common splits in legal discourse.
Second, one can take note that the splits are grouped into clusters.
The clusters form groups of splits that are closely related. This reading
suggests that each element in one cluster can be redefined by opposing
it to any element on the opposite side of the same cluster. Thus, rather
than opposing slavery to freedom, one might oppose it to consent or
choice or free will. This recombination of the elements of splits is one
of the ways in which legal meaning is produced.
Third, one could disregard the clusters entirely and read the list as
one continuous whole. In this case, each new split represents a slight
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variation on the previous one. This reading would show how splits mediate in the production of legal meaning. It also shows how each of the
splits can be related to all others.
Fourth, one can read the list the same way but start at the end, in
over form ends with the
content
which case a decision to privilege 12
1
privileging of slavery over freedom.
121. I am not suggesting that there is anything inexorable to such a conclusion. Quite
the contrary, my point is that it is important to focus on the ways in which splits are presented
in legal discourse, lest the conclusion in the text accompanying this footnote be the one
adopted.
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APPENDIX 2: CATCH-22 AND THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE
OF LEGAL DISCOURSE

The structure of the catch-22 can help to explain the ideological
dimensions of legal discourse. As suggested in the main text, we often
treat doctrine as if it were unified or coherent because we focus, for
instance, upon the constative meaning of the doctrine and suppress its
performative significance. Sometimes, we do the reverse. By way of
illustration, consider Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., a case where the Supreme Court held that proof of racially discriminatory purpose or intent is generally required to establish a claim

of unconstitutional race discrimination.1 22 The Court there drew an
ostensibly non-exhaustive list of the ways this racial animus could be
demonstrated. Below is a series of statements expressing the significance of the Arlington Heights doctrine. My purpose is to show how each
successive statement shifts the focus farther from the constative significance of the doctrine to its performative significance.' 23
Constative Significance
The doctrine states that
proof of racial animus
is generally (though
not necessarily)
required to make out a
claim of race
discrimination under
the Equal Protection
Clause.

Performative Significance

124

Because proof of
racially discriminatory
animus is rather hard
to come by (since it is
produced by the
defendants), plaintiffs
will have to work very
hard to obtain such
proof or bring fewer
claims of race 25
discrimination. 1
122. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
123. In other words, statements on the left of the page tend to focus on the constative
significance of the doctrine, while statements on the right of the page tend to focus on the
performative significance of the doctrine. (Obviously, it's possible to disagree with the distribution I have made-but then again, that's one of the points: The split between constative and
performative is unstable.)
In order to avoid confusion, it is important to understand that the chart does not attempt
to map the constative or performative character of the statements themselves. Indeed, each of
these statements has some constative significance inasmuch as each claims to offer true propositions about the significance of Arlington Heights. And each statement, as scholarly endeavor, has some performative significance in that each ratifies and furthers some vision of
what law really is and how it should be interpreted.
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Performative Significance
Given that the Supreme
Court has made things
so difficult for race
discrimination plaintiffs
(when it clearly did not
have to), this decision
will greatly reduce the
number of successful1 2 6

discrimination suits.
Because Arlington
Heights places a
premium upon
evidence of intent, it
effectively allows
defendants not to
worry about the Equal
Protection Clause so
long as they avoid
manufacturing evidence
12 7
of racial animus.
This decision operates

to legitimate existing
patterns of racial
28
oppression.1
124. See Miller, Proof of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause:
Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 725, 739 (1977) (student author).
This Term, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
the Court reaffirmed the Davis requirement of discriminatory purpose and discussed
the kinds of evidence which would establish discriminatory purpose.
... The Court noted that proof of disproportionate racial impact is probative of
discriminatory purpose and did not exclude the possibility that such an impact could
by itself be sufficient in some cases.
Id. at 740-41, 743 (footnotes omitted).
125. See Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond. DiscriminatoryPurpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961.
Arlington Heights demonstrated much more vividly than Davis just how difficult it
will be to prove purposeful discrimination, particularly if the challenge is to essentially passive or indifferent state action that perpetuates de facto segregation and if
that action involves the exercise of substantial governmental discretion.
Id. at 1034.
126.
The primary difficulty, of course, is that improper purpose is hard to prove, and
Davs, Arlington Heights, and Castanedaall demonstrate that an equal protection claimant will be hard pressed to establish the necessary discriminatory racial purpose.
The effect, if not the actual purpose, of these decisions will be to reduce the number
of meritorious civil rights claims that can be successfully brought under the equal
protection clause.
Id. at 1050-51.
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The same distinction between constative and performative signifi-

cance also helps to explain why some people consider law and economics scholarship to be a serious intellectual pursuit while others dismiss it

as mere ideological noise. The catch-22 explains how it is possible for
law and economics scholarship to be both at once. 129
127. See DeVise, Housing Discrimination in the Chicago Metropolitan Area: The Legacy of the
Brown Decision, 34 DE PAUL L. REV. 491 (1985).
[S]tatements in the public record of discriminatory intent on the part of officials engaged in policies with disproportionate racial impact are rare.
Thus, Arlington Heights requires plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent without
acknowledging that public officials will rarely provide plaintiffs with the requisite
evidence.
Id. at 509-10.
128. See Freeman, Legitimizing RacialDiscrimination Through AntidiscriminationLaw: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1049-52, 1102-03 (1978).
129. See Appendix 3 infra.
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THE FOUR MOVES AND THE IDEOLOGY
OF LEGAL DISCOURSE

The four moves I have described are useful in uncovering hidden
foundationalist assumptions or implicit formalizations of issues, problems, doctrines, or theories. By way of illustration, consider what the
application of the four moves to Posner's brand of law and economics
might reveal.1 3 0
The infinite regress, for instance, impeaches the foundationalist attempt to ground law. The significance of this foundationalist move is
not just that it allows some edifice to be built. There is also significance
in what the foundationalist strategy excludes. For instance, the supposition of consumer rationality in law and economics produces all sorts
of significant conclusions for the explanation and fashioning of legal
doctrine. 13 1 But the significance of this foundationalist assumption is
also to be found in all of the claims it precludes. The infinite regress
turns the assumption of consumer rationality upon itself: Is it rational
to make this assumption or not?
The infinite regress gives a special urgency to this question precisely
because there are some situations in which it would not be rational to
assume that human beings are rational. Why then should the premise
of rationality have the weight that it does? Why is it framed as an epistemological burden of persuasion: "In the absence of any information to
the contrary, we will assume that human beings act rationally in the
market."? 132 And why is the assumption susceptible to defeat only if
one can proffer "information to the contrary"? Why, in other words, is
130. I choose Posner's law and economics work as an example because it has a highly
visible and, in appearance at least, a relatively rigid structure. See Schlag, supra note 12, at
933-43. These characteristics of his work make it easier to apply the four moves and to reveal
the ideological aspects of the work. I have thus chosen a relatively easy example. A less
formalized, less transparent theory than Posner's would present a greater challenge because
of the complexity involved. One should not surmise, however, that so-called "more complex," "more sophisticated," or "more sensitive" theories are immune to the four moves.
There is, after all, a certain ideological aspect to the construction of theories that are so complex and intricate that their structures are not readily visible.
131. See R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 4 (discussing the fundamental assumption of rationality). In his comments on the work of Ronald Coase and Aaron Director, Harold Demsetz
succinctly described these conclusions:
Although they [Coase & Director] seem to be different and to address different
problems, there was a common theme, and that was to assume that people try to
maximize and that really there is competition in the attempt to maximize, and to use
those working assumptions to try to explain lots of things, like why you have firms,
why you have particular pricing practices. All the conclusions derive from the attempt of maximizers to overcome certain kinds of costs impediments to maximizing
which we now subsume under the name of transaction costs. These things become
readily explainable-readily, that is, looking backward-if you take those two assumptions and keep pushing them.
Kitch, The Fzre of Truth: A Remembrance of Lau, and Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 163, 204 (1983).
132. For an interesting attempt to translate these epistemological assumptions into a
formal regime for antitrust law, see Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1
(1984).
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the assumption only subject to defeasance by "scientific" or "empirical" evidence? Are any of these choices rational?
One answer to this line of questions is that one assumes that human
beings are rational (absent contrary information) because that is what
the integrity of microeconomic theory requires and there are reasons to
adhere to the theory. Again, one can use the infinite regress to question this position. Why is the integrity of theory a first premise? Why
must the integrity of the theory take precedence over other needs, interests, and knowledges? The infinite regress even allows the tables to
be turned completely: Do the law and economics scholars adhere to
the assumption of rationality for the sake of the theory (as they claim)
or do they adhere to the theory and its products in order to vindicate
the assumption of rationality and the political implications they believe
it yields? Put concretely, do the prodigious theoretical efforts of law
and economics scholars serve to explain and predict the development
of law or do they serve, instead, to validate the politics associated with
the assumption of rationality? 13 3 The first possibility implies that they
are engaged in serious scholarship. The second one suggests that such
work is an ideological enterprise. It is quite possible, of course, that
both implications are true-a possibility suggested by the catch-22.
The answer to the question about whether it is rational to assume
that human beings are rational arguably depends upon what one wants
to accomplish with this assumption. And now, here comes the proliferation of splits. Posner's answer to this question is that economics
provides the best explanation of human behavior. Posner makes no
claim that economics is the best interpretation of human
behavior (a seemingly untenable claim); he merely claims that it is best
able to predict human behavior (by comparison with, say,
psychoanalysis). 134
Pressing on the infinite regress, the question arises: Why is it rational to pursue explanation at the expense of interpretation, as Posner's
law and economics appears to do? Answer: Because explanation has
predictive value whereas interpretation does not. And why should one
be interested in the predictive value of theory? Presumably, because a
theory that can be used to predict human behavior can be used to control human behavior. In short, predictive theories are powerful. 135 One
can see how split proliferation works. The assumption of rationality is
justified and defined by a series of mediations: The assumption allows
explanation,
prediction,
133. One can then question whether the role of law and economics scholarship is indeed
to provide an explanation for law or is instead to serve the ideological aim of eliminating
certain types of claims and arguments about law and social life.
134. R. POSNER, supra note 28, at 13-14.
135. For a brief discussion of the role of aesthetic criteria in the evaluation of theoretical
work, see Schlag, supra note 20, at 921-22.
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control,
power.
Now, these mediations which attempt to stabilize and redeem the assumption of rationality are really poles of some splits. In each case,
there is another pole which has been rejected. The rejected poles
might (though need not) be described as follows:
Rejected

Adopted

interpretation
edification
understanding
liberation

explanation
prediction
control
power

Now, it hardly seems self-evident that rationality should be associated
with the right hand and not with the left hand terms. And when we
reach the final split (power versus liberation), it seems downright
strange to associate rationality with power rather than liberation.
My point quite simply is that the attempt to stabilize or redeem the
assumption of rationality is dependent upon a series of splits. Once
those splits are revealed, several problems become evident. First, the
split proliferation shows the vulnerability of formalist confinement. If
one is interested in a rational theory of human behavior, it truly
stretches the imagination that one would exclude that part of the
human condition which calls for interpretation, edification, understanding, and liberation as legitimate fields of inquiry. Second, the split
proliferation above reveals that the mediations actually deployed by
Posner are at least in part ideological ones-they have no more
grounding in rationality than the rejected choices.
The catch-22 also helps to explain the ideological aspects of legal
discourse by locating the contradictions intrinsic to positions and the
assumptions that seem to have coherence and integrity. Consider, for
instance, the significance of positing that human beings are rational
maximizers of self-interest. On one level, the position means that, in a
given social-legal context, human beings will adjust their behavior to
get the most of what they want. On another level, however, the assumption ratifies the existing distribution of entitlements by suggesting that
what people actually want is in their self-interest and that what they get
is what they chose-to maximize their self-interest. This last implication of the assumption of rationality allows the lawyer-economists to
look at what people in fact do to ascertain their self-interest. The assumption has a dual function: It serves as a prediction about human
behavior, and it also functions as a heuristic device to allow the derivation of a psychological state (namely, want) from people's actual
behavior.
It is thus somewhat of a mystery, as Arthur Leff once pointed out,
why the social-legal context is not always perfectly attuned to give
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human beings what they want. 136 The lawyer-economists have answers
to this question largely based on transaction cost analysis and thirdparty effects. 13 7 But these answers collapse in a catch-22: People do
not always do what they want, and they do not always want what they
do. The lawyer-economists, of course, have special ways of finding this
out (independently of what people do ... and by implication, of what
they want). Again, the point is that the catch-22 is a useful technique
for uncovering the ideological twists of legal discourse.
The overkill is likewise a useful entry point into the ideology of legal
discourse. By focusing on the extreme applications of doctrines, assumptions, and theories, one can uncover fault lines that lie submerged
throughout the entire edifice. Consider, for instance, Posner's application of microeconomic analysis to marital love. He considers marital
love a convenient and efficient substitute for formal contracting. To
Posner, love is a way of avoiding transaction costs. This is an extraordinarily bizarre account of love. But what precisely is wrong with it? One
answer is that if Posner is right, love is hardly what it's cracked up to be.
Another answer is that Posner seems to have missed the point of what
we want from an account of love. His explanation makes no sense of
the experience. The overkill implicit in extending microeconomic categories to love triggers the realization that Posner's microeconomic survey of law and social life has suppressed
interpretation,
edification,
understanding,
liberation
(and everything else in life that does not reduce to mechanics).
In sum, the four moves are helpful entry points into the exploration
of the ideological structure and content of legal discourse.
136. See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451,
462-69 (1974).
137. See Schlag, supra note 12, at 933-45.
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APPENDIX

CANNIBAL MOVES
4:

THE INFINITE REGRESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

Two hundred years later, the infinite regress provides many distinct
(and competitive) vantage points from which to approach the constitutional text. And there is no agreement about which perspective is primary or most important. Indeed, it is staggering how many different
credible endings can be attached to the phrase, "The first and paramount question for normative constitutional theory is ...
1. What is the appropriate role of the Supreme Court among the
political branches? (a theory ofjudicial review) 13 8 or
2. What is the function of the Constitution or any of its parts? (a political theory)' 3 9 or
3. What type of reasoning should the Court use in its decisions? (a
theory of legal reasoning)1 4 0 or
4. What types of questions are best suited to decisionmaking by adjudication rather than by legislation or management? (a theory of institutional competence) 141 or
5. What minimal entitlements must ajust and legitimate state guarantee? (a political philosophy)1 42 or
1 43
6. What does the Constitution mean? (a theory of interpretation).
The mere listing of these various approaches suggests another step
into the infinite regress of constitutional contexts within contexts. One
obvious move, for instance, is to argue that none of the six questions is
primary and that instead we should pursue a sort of "enlightened"
muddle-through approach. Another step is to disagree with the way I
have framed the dilemma of normative constitutional theory. (But unless I am totally wrong, this disagreement would only serve to support
my point.)
In this context of intellectual disarray, the sober advice (yet another
move) that we should stop all these gyrations and get back to the text
can seem very appealing. 144 And yet such invitations resolve nothing at
all. On the contrary, a firm and steadfast commitment to any one of the
six ways of reading the text might well lead to the adoption of any of
the five others as one proceeds in the reading.

138. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
139. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
FirtAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
140. See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 47, at 516-18; Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,60 TEX. L.
REV. 527, 548-49 (1982).
141. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980);
Komesar, Taking Institutions Senously: Introduction to a Strateg for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 U.

CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).
142. See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
143. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, InterpretingThis Constitution: The Unhelpful ContributionsofSpecial
Theones ofjudicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 209 (1983).
144. Id.
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Thus, one might begin with authentic commitment to a "strict textualist" approach, read through articles I and II without difficulty, but
recognize upon reaching article III and those words "cases" and "controversies" 145 that indeed the Constitution requires the articulation of
a theory of judicial review. One can read the rest of the document accordingly, and realize by the time one gets to the fourteenth amendment (and those vague but majestic words, "equal protection of the
laws" 146) that the Constitution (and a theory ofjudicial review) requires
the articulation of a full-fledged political theory. By the time one
reaches the end, one might decide to read the document again.
Rereading the document, from the perspective of political theory,
one might begin to grasp that the grants of power in the first three
articles have some logic-something akin to a theory of separation of
powers, or even institutional competence. This in turn could well yield
the conclusion that only certain types of cases, those amenable to judicial reason, are within the article III power. And so on ....
145. U.S. CONST. art. III,
146. Id. amend. XIV, 1.

2, cl. 1.

